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INTRODUCTION
Two hundred years hence, European historians may
look back and place as much importance on the signing of
the Common Market Treaty on March 27, 1957, as Americans
place on the ratification of the Constitution by the
original thirteen colonies.

At the end of World War II,

after centuries of national greed, ethnic and provincial
differences, political absolutism and endless conflict,
the nations of Western Europe began to make genuine pro
gress toward economic and political unity and stability.
The total economic collapse caused by the war and the threat
of Communism forced these nations to realize that some form
of unity was imperative to peace and prosperity in Europe.
American statesmen on the other hand saw an oppor
tunity to accomplish within a very brief span, perhaps a
generation, what Europeans had been unable to do in modern
history.

Besides this, the United States could gain a

trading partner who would in turn become a military ally
and a buffer between itself and the Soviet Union.

The al

ternative to such unification would have been step by step
but eventual control of Western Europe by Communism.

As

a prelude to economic and possible political unification,
the United States projected several programs of moral and
financial assistance toward Europe.
i

These programs were

ii

geared to cooperate with European efforts in the same
direction.
This essay will describe and evaluate the role of
the United States in the economic unification of Western
Europe and the development of American policy toward the
European Economic Community.

CHAPTER I
AMERICAN INITIATIVE
During World War II, the United States did not
develop any enthusiasm for any form of European political
unity.

Throughout

1943

and

1944

a United States Department

of State sub-committee on European organization met irregul
arly to study

11

proposals for the organization of Europe on

a regional or group basis.11 1

The investigation revealed

that while some European statesmen showed an inclination
toward some form of unification, it was equally doubtful
that such European union was desirable from the American
point of view.2
United States reservations were partially economic.
The committee reasoned that removal of trade barriers be
tween nations might well be replaced by equally restrictive
European ones.

Others argued that a strong and united

Europe would have a tendency to stimulate the economy,
raise income and open markets for American goods.3 An
1 U.S. Department of State, Sub-committee on European
Organization, uchronological Minutes, June 4, 1943, 11 2.
2Hans Schmitt, Path to European Union (Baton Rouge,
1962), 13.
3sub-Committee on European Organization, 11Analytical
Minutes, October 29, 1943, 11 2.
1

2

attitude of caution and reserve was recommended rather than
outright opposition, and even this school of thought did
They

not dismiss as unfeasible some form of political union.

even went so far as to suggest that this might be imperative
in order to preclude

11

non-European 11 conquest of the continent.4

Although there was no unanimity of thought about the
future of European unity, this committee did agree on con
ditions under which it might be acceptable to America.
these were the following:

Amon g

the organs of the union would be

democratic; opportunity for reconsideration of the union wou ld
be made periodically; no merger of nations should take place
without the consent of the citizens involved; and lastly,
each nation should remain a separate political unit and hold
separate membership in a world organization.5 Practically
all these conditions were incorporated to varying degrees
in later schemes of unification, particularly in the European
Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community.
When this committee adjourned sine die on i'Ia.rch 31,
1944, they had failed to provide any workable plan for European
unity other than the stipulations laid down above.6 For ap
proximately two years after the war, until 1947, the United
4
schmitt, Path to European Union, 14.
5sub-Committee on European Organization,
R 6Jc, January 7, 1944, 11 3.

11

Document

6Ibid.,
nAnalytical Minutes, March 3, 1944, r? 3.

3
States was for all practical purposes uninterested in the
subject.

During this time unforeseen economic and political

events developed to change the picture.
Meanwhile on the European side of the Atlantic,
peace slowed down most progress toward a united Europe,
as the continent faced the problems of reconstruction.
Little further progress was achieved until 1947 when the

United States became convinced of the value of unification.7
By early 1947, it was becoming more apparent that
the total European economic system was too weak even to
begin a recovery program.

A pivotal event occurred on Feb

ruary 21, 1947, when the government of Great Britain informed
Washington that British aid to Greece and Turkey was going
to end, which in effect meant that Britain was relinquishing
its historic rtbalance of power role. 11

This also marked the

end of unplanned crisis-to-crisis aid on the part of the
American government.

The United States had furnished a

major part of the capital for the United Nations Relief and
Recovery Administration, provided aid to the individual

national economies and responded to individual emergencies.8
With Britain's abandonment of Greece and Turkey,
President Truman sent to Congress a request for aid for these
two countries to prevent a Communist takeover.9 This

7schmitt, Path to European Union, 16.
8 Ibid., 18-19.
9rsmet Inona, 11 Negotiation and the National Interest,
11
in Joseph E. Johnson (ed.), Perspectives on. Peace 1910-1960
( New York, 1960) , 14-2.

4
legislation, which came to be the basis of the 11Truman
Doctrine,n was enacted into law on May 22, 1947.
was a turning point of American policy.

This

This "policy of

containment,it expanded through the Marshall Plan,led to a
rehabilitation of Western Europe.10 However, between the
time of Britain's announcement and the passage of the act
aiding Greece and Turkey the crucial Moscow Conference on
Germany took place.11 This meeting was planned to explore
the possibilities of reuniting East and West Germany.

Be

cause of Russian intransigence, it produced no agreement in
that direction.
As a result of this conference Secretary of State
George C. Marshall became convinced that Russia was biding
its time until conditions were ripe for total economic col
lapse of Western Europe and the subsequent triumph of Communism
there.

It was c�ear that not only politics but economics as

well made it imperative to find a solution.for Europe's com
partmentalization.12 Because of the dire economic conditions
of Europe and the attitude of the Kremlin, it became apparent
that a far-reaching p
· rogram of tremendous proportions attacking
the basic problems must be projected.

In the State Department

10Boris Meissner; rrsoviet Russia's Foreign Policy:
Ideology_and Powei:- Politics,u in David S. Collier and Kurt
Glaser (eds.), Western Integration and the Future of Eastern
E�rop� (Chicago, 1964), 91.
11i4arch 10·- April 24, 1947.
12Robert L. Heilbroner, orging a United Europe:The
Story of the Euro ean Community fPublic Affairs Pamphlets;
New York, 1961), �.

5
instructions were drafted: in terms of tteconomic unification 11
and HEuropean economic federation.n 1 3

1947, the United States had al
14
ready spent over ten billion dollars on post-war relief.
At the beginning of

Even after such a heavy expenditure United States leadership
came to realize that this effort was only stop-gap assistance,
and a program of systematic, comprehensive, and long-term
assistance was going to be necessary in order for Europe to

1
recover. 5

By the first week in June,

1947, Secretary of State

Marshall, Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson and other
staff members had formulated what later came to be known as
the Marshall Plan.

Marshall officially launched the plan

with an address to a meeting of Harvard alumni on June 5,

1947, in which he declared:
The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements
for the next three or four years of foreign food and
other essential.products--principally from America-are so much greater than her present ability to pay that
she must have substantial additional help or face economic,
social gnd political deterioration of a very grave char
acter. 1
1

cnmitt,
3S,
.
path to European Union, 20.

14walter Hallstein,

11 The European Community and the
United States of America, 11 address delivered before a con
ference on t 1Europe, America and World Trade" organized by the
European Movement in the Netherla.nds at Amsterdam, Netherlands,
February 4, 1965, Mimeograph copy, 1.

15Ibid., 2.

16 George C. Marshall, nEuropean Unity, 11 Vital Speeches
of the Day, XIII (July 1, 1947), 553-554.

In opposition to reports of the Sub-Committee of

1943- 1944,

6

he went on to state that there was no time to fear a unified
Europe and there was no time for aid to individual countries
on a piecemeal basis lffrom crisis to crisis . • • •

The pro

gram should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all,
European nations.11 17
He proposed that in drafting a program of recovery

18
the nations of Europe should formulate the program themselves,

and that they should agree on what part they "will take in
order to give proper effect to whatever action might be under
taken by the Governrnent." 19 After this was accomplished, then
the United States would determine what support it would give.
Describing the program as temporary he estimated its duration
to be three or four years.20
In the Harvard address there were three major concepts:
that the program be confined to the European region; that close
cooperation among the states' economies was essential; and
that a permanent cure for the European economy be based on a
combination of this cooperation with a temporary program of
assistance by the United States.21 Basically the Plan was an
17Ibid., 2.
18christian Herter, Toward an Atlantic Community
(New
York, 1963), 1 6.
19

Marshall, trEuropean Unity, 11 554.

20ibid.
21 Ben T. Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe (New
York, 1958), 17.

7
application of economic policy to foreign affairs.22

Through

the 1 �Iarshall Plan n America offered to the Europeans as much
help as they needed to feed their people, ensure supplies of
raw material and once more set the economy in motion.23 There

was one condition imposed; they must work together.24

From

all evidence the offer apparently was made to all nations of
Europe regardless of political alignment.

In making such a

broad offer the United States took a rather carefully cal
culated risk, one which called ·the hand of the Soviet Union
and its satellite states.25 The proposals he outlined were
addressed to 1rEurope. 11

He .did· not further define the term in

his speech but later agreed that he included European Russia
as well,26 although �e was skeptical that they would be in
terestect.27 He declared:
Our, policy is directed not against any country or doc
trine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and
22James
David Zellerbach·, ttThe Common Market: An
Economic Instrument of International Policy, n The Department
of State Bulletin,X.XXVII (October 14, 1957), 608.
23Hallstein, "The European Community and the United
States, 11 -2.
24zellerbach, 11 The Common Market:
·
Instrument of International Policy," 61"0.
25

An Economic

Herter, Toward an Atlantic Community, 6.

26wenzel Jaksch, 11 Neo-Imperialism Versus European
Partnership, 11 in David S. Collier and Kurt Glasen (eds.),
Western Integration and the Future of Eastern Europe (Chicago,
1964), 72.
27 zellerbach,

The Common Market:
Instrument of International Policy, n 610.
11

An Economic

chao s. Its purpo se should be the revival of a workin g
econo my in the world so as to permit the emergen ce of
political and so cial conditio ns in which free institutions
can exist. 28
He determined that he himself would

not

be respon sible for

excluding Russi a, subsequen tly splitting Europe. 29
On July 16, 1947, in Paris, sixteen
the Committee

of

natio n s o rgan ized

European Economic Coo peration .

The primary

functio n of this co mmittee was to develo p a fo ur year re
covery program.30 In these negotiations over how American
aid was to be used, sharp differen ces developed from the be
ginn in g.

The European representatives, an xious for immediate

aid, devoted much
was

needed

of

their effort to determini ng how much aid

and ho w it was to be allocated.

Very little em

phasis an d no strong language or con victions were evident con 
cerning Euro pean economic cooperation .31 However, American
policy had developed by this time well beyond a program of
limited cooperation .

It envisio ned a customs union elimin

ating tariffs an d other trade barriers within the region .
Marshall, "Euro pean Un ity, 11 553.

28
29

christian Herter, "Tenth Anniversary of the OEEc, rr
The Department of State Bulletin, XX.XVIII (May 1 2, 1958), 789.
30schmitt, Path to European Union, 24. The sixteen
nation s were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fran ce, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxenbourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, an d the United Kin gdom.
31U.S. Departme
n t o f State, As£ects of Curren t America n
F�
o�re
P�o_li
_ i
�
� �g�n-c:c
��c�y, Department of State Puolication 2961 (Washing ton ,
Octo ber 20, 1947), JO.

9
Beyond this, the United States wanted an organization which
would become �-permanent institution to function as a bulwark
of economic unification.

The result of this difference of

opinion was a compromise--the organization would be permanent
but no continuing obligations in the tariff area were forth.
2
coming.3
In spite of failure in achieving its goal of a common
European economy the United States went ahead with the pro
gram anyway, hoping at least to move in that direction during
the tenure of the Plan.33

This new policy toward Europe des

cribed several essential goals.

The first of these was the

establishment, or restablishment, of a series of strong states
in the democratic tradition.
to American security.

This was considered essential

The second goal was the achievement of

a stable European economy independent of extraordinary outside
aid.

This in turn depended on the establishment of a sound
domestic economy and stable international relations.34 Third,
a joint organization to exert sustained common effort to
achieve economic cooperation was required for the attainment
of these goals.

The basic idea was that European economic

unification was necessary not only for recovery but also to
maintain Europe's economic strength.
32
Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe, 19.
33Ibid., 22.
34Ibid.,
20.

10
On April 16, 1948, just two weeks after the Congress
had appropriated five billion dollars as working capital;these
nations signed the convention by which the Organization for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was born.

Although the

OEEC decided how the aid would be directed within the various
economies, the aid itself went directly to the individual
nation.35

This was the turning point, and the source of the

miracle of recovery.

Beginning in 1948, and until the middle

of 1954, an immense flow of goods to the value of fifteen
billion dollars poured into the Western European economy from
all over the world--all at the expense of the United States.
Approximately eighty per cent of this aid was in outright
grants while the balance was loaned.36 When assistance under
the Marshall Plan ended it was replaced by the Mutual Security
Act of 1949 which provided not only military aid but more
economic assistance as well.

This act, granting six billion

dollars more in aiq, brought with it additional advantages
over and above the aid itself.

By selling the goods delivered

by the United States to their o\m domestic economies the
nations of Europe raised a tremendous amount of money in their
own currencies.37 During the fifteen year period between
35

uniting
· · Euro e, The European Community 1950-1964
(Yeovil, England, 1964}, 2.
36Hallstein, TTThe Economic Community and the United
States, n 2.
37rbid.,

J.

Over ten billion dollars was raised.

11
1948 and 1963 these ncounterpart funds," as they were called,
were used to finance investments worth about ten billion
dollars and were spread over all sectors of the European
economy.

Within the OEEC the countries of Western Europe

were encouraged to liberalize their trade with each other
without the requirement of granting to the United States the
same requirements under the nmost-favored-nation 11 clause.
This encouraged closer internal trade within Europe and gave
their economy more breathing room. 38
The true measure of the success of the Marshall Plan
:wasthat it was completed within three or four years and that
it enabled the recipients, in turn, to develop aid programs
of their own.

During the period 1956 to 1961, aid to under
developed countries by European countries more than doubled.39
In the summer of 1949, the Economic Cooperation Adminis

tration (ECA), established to administer ifurshall Aid, realized
that after almost two years of successful activity, very little
if any progress toward European economic unity had been achieved
in most areas.
materialized.

IvJany plans were talked about, but nothing had
At the insistence of Congress the ECA through

its administrator Paul G. Hoffman undertook another major
American effort in this direction.

In a speech of October 31,

39navid Ormsby Gore, "Britain and the New Europe, n
.
in James C. Charlesworth (ed.), The New Europe: Implications
for the United States (The Annals of the American.Academy of
Political and Social Science; Philadelphia, 1963), 3-4.

12
1949, to the ministers of the OEEC nations, he advised them
of the urgency of taking concrete steps toward economic unifi
cation and the formation of a common market.40 In order to
accomplish this he suggested the following avenues be taken:
1) substantial coordination of fiscal and monetary poli
cies by the countries,
2) the means to effect necessary adjustments of exchange
rates,
3) provisions for cushioning temporary disturbances in
the flow of trade and payments between countries, and
4) insurance against the imposition of restrictive com
mercial policies which would thwart the integration
measures.41
Actually what Hoffman was aiming at was a payment union, rather
than an economic union.

He further predicted that unless much

closer unity could be accomplished within the remaining two
year period of the recovery program the pressure of the in
dividual European state to earn dollars after the Marshall
Plan had ended would revive the "vicious cycle of economic
nationalism.n42 Those stipulations 'Which he laid down would
in effect open the way for Marshall Aid to cushion the short
run dislocations which such a program would involve and vir
tually guarantee American aid for an additional two year
3
In essence, this was a threat. Rather than lose
period.4
40
Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and Its
Meaning (Ithica, New York, 1955), 122-123.
41u.s. Economic Cooperation Administration, Second
Report to Congress (Washington, D. C., 1950), 3, quoted in
Schmitt, Path to European Union, 57.
4

�oore, NATO and the Future of Europe, 30.

43Ibid.

13
American aid the OEEC became earnest on the matter, developed
a program to liberalize trade and payments, and by summer of
1950. established a European Payments Union (EPU).

This was

sufficient assurance to continue American aid.44
This organization acted as a clearing house for all
monetary transactions between member states of the OEEC and
also between these countries and their colonies and other
territories with the same currencies.45 This Union provided
the OEEC states with a multilateral basis for settling currenc y
transfers.46 The prior alternative was a long series of bi
lateral transfers without recourse to third party assets.
By facilitating the flow of capital between nations the EPU
went a long way toward the liberalization of inter-European
trade and paved the way for the abolition of discriminatory
practices and tariffs.47
Among other major accomplishments of the OEEC, be
sides the establishment of the EPU and the removal of trade
quotas a�ong members, was a third less visible but more
44

uniting Europe, The European Community 1950-1964, 2.

45
W. O. Henderson, The Genesis of the Common �Iarket
{C_hicago, 1962), 133-134.
46
47

Herter, Toward an Atlantic Community, 17.

Henderson, Genesis of the Common Market, 134. The
EPU covered the sterling area, and those states using the
French franc, the Belgium franc, the Dutch florin and the Portu
guese escudo. By 1955, twenty-five percent of world trade
was settled through the EPU.

14
important economic result.48

This was the exposure to all

nations involved of the economic condition of each country.49

This was a stipulation vrhich the United States imposed as a
condition for the Marshall Plan. This practice encouraged
economic cooperation and a sense of community interests and
standards, thereby making an important contribution to economic
5
unification.0
The OEEC gradually declined as the European economy
flourished. The purpose of the organization now became obso
lete, but it did continue to function in an advisory and ad
ministrative capacity. It made various suggestions for the
further expansion of the European economy, but they failed
5
On April 2,
to carry any weight.1
5 195$, the tenth anniver
sary of the signing of the treaty by which OEEC was organized,
Under-secretary of State Christian Herter expressed America's
continuing interest in OEEC:
The United States has maintained a deep interest in
the OEEC since its inception. In addition to watching
its progress with much satisfaction, the United States
has closely associated itself with the work of the
Organization and has wherever appropriate, participated
8
4J.
F.Derrian, flThe External Policy of the European
(ed.), Euro ean
Economic Community, 11 in Melvin G.Shimm
�
Regional Communities (Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1962), 2.
49 Herter, nTenth Anniversary of the OEEc,n 790.
Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe, 29.
0
5 william Diebold, Jr., 11 The Process of European
Integration, 11 in Lawrence B.Krause (ed.), The Common Market,
Progress and Controversy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964,
)
JO.
51Henderson, The Genesis of the Common rvTarket, 136.

15
regularly and with deep interest in its activities.
This sympathetic interest in the activities of the
OEEC has been founded on the same recognition of the
need for unity and strength in Europe that prompted our
initiative in 1947. This has in fact constituted for
many years a central feature of our foreign policy. 52
After the Moscow Conference of 1947 and the subsequent
rejection of Marshall aid the Communists gradually developed
a strangle-hold on Eastern Europe.

Russia's immediate re

action was refusal to permit her satellite states to parti
cipate in the Aid program.

In September, 1947, representative s

of the several Communist parties organized the Communist In
formation Bureau or Cominform which became Russia's consistant
answer to both the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.53
Its purpose was to spread and strengthen the Communist move
ment throughout the world.

Later, in 1955, Russian reaction

developed further as she organized her satellite states into
the Warsaw Pact.

As Russia by this time had the participants

under absolute control�the Pact had only propaganda signifi
cance.54
The United States soon realized that Communist domin
ation of the entire European continent .. would also involve
America.

This danger developed to sizable proportions in

February, 1948, when Czechoslovakia came under the rule of
the Communist party with the protection of Russian troops,
52 Herter, nTenth Anniversary of the OEEC, 11 791.
53schmitt, Path to European Union, 4.
3
54Herter, Toward an Atlantic Community, 6.

16
and grew even greater when the Russians tried unsuccessfully
to blockade free Berlin. 55

It was obvious that the entire

continent of Europe, unable to defend itself was in danger of
succumbing to the Communist menace.56
In view of the fact that Russia tried so desperately
to thwart the purposes of the Marshall Plan, the leaders in
Western Europe and the United States abandoned hope of pro

moting any form of mutual security through the United Nations. 57
In the autumn of 1947, at the United Nations, just months

after the Moscow conference and before the Marshall Plan was
actually instituted, and again in April of 1948, at the
Canadian House of Commons, Canada's Foreign Minister, Louis
St. Laurent suggested that a separate defense organization of
the free world be given consideration.58 This would circum
vent the Soviet veto in the United Nations Security Council.
After the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in
February of 1948, more impetus was given this idea.

European

interest developed to the extent that the !!Brussels Treaty
Organization n or "Western Union n was established by the Brussels
Treaty of March 17, 1948, the signatory nations being Belgium,
55Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe, 23.
56Julius C. Holmes, "United States Foreign Policy and
the Situation in Europe, 11 Department of State Bulletin, XX.XVI
(March L., 1957), 344.

57Herter, Toward an Atlantic Communitz, 5-7.
58Moore, NATO and the Future of Europe, 22.

17
Britain, France, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands.59

The

nations pledged to come to each other's defense should any
one of them be attacked�but due to the lack of economic capa
bility there was little or no military potential in
Union.11

11

Western

6O
On

the other hand, however, United States thinking

centered on an Atlantic unity rather than a European one,
and one in which the United States and Canada would be full
partners. 61 In advocating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) the formula of self-help and mutual aid was
borrowed from the Marshall Pla�but the pattern of organiz
ation was similar to the Organization of American States
rather than OEEc.62 Under the North Atlantic Treaty the
United States would assume permanent responsibility for
bearing its share of the burden of mutual defense.

This

differed from the Marshall Plan in that the aid given to the
OEEC

nations was temporary.

Europeans generally favored the

idea of NATO over their own nwestern Union 11 even ·with a pos
sible alliance between it and the United States.6 3 On April

4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signedithus guaranteeing
59Ibid.,
23.
6O

Holmes, 11 United States Foreign Policy and the
Situation in Europe, n 344.
61Moore, NATO and the Future
of Euro:ee, 25.
62

Herter, Toward an Atlantic Communitr, 7.

63

Moore, NATO and the Future of Euro:ee, 25, 27.

18
a formal alliance for the defense of the Atlantic community. 64
It constituted the core of the Western alliance system 65 and
was a unique organization in that the influences at work
within sought to draw the alliance closer together. 66 Essen
tially it has been an important factor in preventing armed
conflict between Russia and the West. 67

In NATO, the United

States certainly was more firmly committed over a wider area
than in any possible relationship with r7Western Union. r;
Although provision was made by the NATO Treaty for
economic expansion and relationship, nothing in this area
materialized. 68 Article II of the NATO Charter stated that
the nations T!i,lfill seek to eliminate conflict in their inter
national economic policies and will encourage economic col
laboration between any and all of them. ,: 69 Ways to accomplish
64

Hallstein, 11 The European Community and the United
States,tt J+. The original drafters of the NATO Treaty were
Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom and the United States. Other original signa
tories were Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal.
Greece and Turkey were acceded October 22, 19 5 1 and the
German Federal Republic on October 23, 19 5 4.
65

1ouis B. Sohn, "Neutralism and the United Nations, i;
in Quincy Wright. (ed,), Preventing World War III Some Pro
posals (New York, 19 62), 361.
66

zellerbach, "The Common Market:
ment of International Policy,n 611.

An Economic Instru

67

1ester B. Pearson, trThe New Face of Diplomacy, 0 in
Joseph E. Johnson (ed.), Perspectives on Peace 1910-19 60
(New York, 19 60), 130.
68

Herter, Toward an Atlantic Community, 2 6, 27.

69Ibid., 26.
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this were not specifically spelled ou-t; and the general con
cept of NATO remained military and political.
After the organization of NATO the major effort to
ward economic unification shifted from the United States to
Europe.

CHAPTER II
EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC UNITY
In Europe economic unification had its beginning in
a monetary convention concluded by the governments-in-exile
of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg in October, 1943.

By

this convention the respective governments pledged to merge
their financial and economic efforts in the post-war world.1
This meeting paved the way, in turn, for the Customs Conven
tion of September, 1944, which further endorsed the concept
of an economic union that could compete favorably in the world
market.

This union had as its objective the elimination of

customs duties between the three countries and the levying
of identical tariffs on products entering from outside the
bloc.

A customs union already had existed between Belgium

and Luxemburg since 1921., and the actual agreement was between
this Belgo-Luxemburg economic union and the Netherlands.2
The three countries hoped at the time of its inception that
the

11

Benelux 11 union, as it came to be called, could become

\uchael T. Florinsky, Integrated Europe? (New York,
1955), 33. An agreement on the relative value of the Belgian
Franc and the Dutch Florin was reached at this convention.
2Hans F. Sennholz, How Can Europe Survive (New York,
1955), 152.
20

21
an all�embracing economic union whereby raw materials, finished
goods and labor could move unhindered across all common bound
aries.
The organization of Benelux was designed to be func
tional in nature with the various departments empowered to
implement the decisions of the Union.

Three departments, or

councils, were proposed with equal representation from both
the Netherlands and the Belgo-Luxemburg union.
The first of these was a customs council designed to
assure uniform legislation on import duties.

Because of dif

ferences arising over points of interpretation of the London
Convention of 1944, a special commission had to be appointed
to assist the council in its work.

The second unit was a

Hunion 17 council whose function, liaison in nature, was to co
ordinate the economic and commercial policies of the three
states.

The third unit was a foreign trade council which was

to coordinate commercial policy with other countries.3
At the London Convention it was agreed that Benelux
would begin functioning as soon as the member nations were
liberated.

This was impossible as the attention of each

government was directed toward the more pressing immediate
problems of reconstruction, credit, monetary reforms and
transportation.4 It was not until April, 1946, that further
3navid T. Roberts, 11 The Dutch-Belgian Economic Union,n
Foreign Affairs, XXV (July, 1947), 692.
4

sennholz, How Can Europe Survive, 152.
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progress was achieved.

At that time ministers from the three

countries met to give impetus to the 1944 agreement.

It soon

became apparent that further difficulties had arisen in the
form of what items would be included on the tariff list and
just how much tariff protection would be needed for certain
other items.

At this point, further serious difficulties

were encountered as both sides were approaching the union
with reservations which precluded complete harmony.

To cope

with this problem a permanent institution, the rrMeeting of
the Prime Ministers,ir was established in March of 1947.

This

body sought to coordinate the work of the three basic councils
and thus accelerate the program of economic union.5
It was also thought that Benelux needed an adminis
trative executive office.

Accordingly, a nsecretariat Generaln
was .established with headquarters in Brussels.6 These new
additions to the organizational machinery enabled Benelux to
become a genuine reality.

After much effort on the part of

all the participating countries and organizations, the customs

union went into effect on January 1, 1948.7

In spite of all the plans and hopes for economic
unification it was soon decided that the customs union was
5

Ibid., 152.

6
Roberts, nnutch-Belgian Economic Union, 11 692.

7

Sennholz, How Can Europe Survive, 154.
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much too narrow an organization to achieve this objective. 8
To alleviate this, Benelux was recast and became an "economic
union 1: in June, 19 48.

The Prime Ministers declared the ob

jectives of this new type union to be:
(1) to return to a system that allows freedom of con
sumption; (2) to reduce governme�t subsidies to producers
and consumers; (3) to coordinate their citizens' invest
ments; (4) to unify fiscal and social policies; (5) to
conduct policies and guarantee monetary equilibrium. 9
In March of 194 9, at the Prime Ministers meeting at
The Hague, the spirit of accord was such that plans of a more
defini_te nature were formulated to bring the economic union .
into a functioning reality. 10 Toward that end a 11 pre-union
period n lasting from July 1, 194 9 until July 1, 1950, was
adopted during which time the three governments would remove
barriers to interstate commerce and coordinate Benelux trade
with other countries. 11
From this hopeful point, however, the history of
Benelux is characterized by disappointment, frustration and
even disunion.

Trouble started with the trade deficits of

8
William Diebold, Jr., r 1 The Re:Yi.eleJX.e of Federalism to
Western European Integration, 11 in Arthur W. McMahon (ed.),
Federalism, Mature and Emergent {Garden City, New York, 1 955),

439.

9

sennholz, How Can Europe Survive, 154.

10
Howard J. Hilton, Jr., 11 Benelux--A Case Study in
Economic Union, 11 Department of State Bulletin, XXII (July 31,
1950), 183.
11

Ibid., 181.

the Netherlands to Belgium.

After this the internal problems

of both countries precluded unification efforts.

The Dutch

were in trouble in Indonesi�while Belgium's King Leopold
abdicated in favor of his son Bedouin.

As a result of these

internal problems, both countries shirked the obligations of
Benelux.
of July

Early in the pre-union period the effective date
1,

1950 .,

was postponed "for the time being.11 12

During the spring of 1950, a balance of payment defi
cit on the part of the Netherlands discouraged further attempt s
at this time.

It was recogpized that as long as such a situ

ation existed equilateral unification would be impossible.
In the following year, when the Dutch found it necessary to
impose new tariff restrictions, the process of union was
actually reversed.

After this, almost no progress toward

economic unification was achieved by Benelux.
Various reasons have been projected for this failure
to achi•eve economic unification.

The most frequently stated

reason was that too wide a difference existed between the
internal economic policies of the two nations.

In the Nether

lands this policy was characterized by rigid state controls,
'while in Belgium a far more liberal policy prevailed.13 Both
the Netherlands and Belgium had discovered that ideas of unifi
cation do not necessarily result in economic balance; but this
12
13

Sennholz, How Can Europe Survive, 155.

Howard S. Ellis, The Economics of Freedom The Prog
ress and Future of Aid to Europe (New York, 1950), j 81.
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balance, if achieved, could open the door to economic union.
During the developments in the Benelux community,
other nations of Western Europe contemplated similar customs
unions.
Italy.14

11

Francita1 n was projected to unite France and
Others were proposed in the Scandinavian area and

None of these managed to get be
yond the tentative agreement stage.15
between Turkey and Greece.

Even more important than the customs unions in the
development of European economic unification was the radically
different experiment in

11

supranationalism n16 which became

known as the nEuropean Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 11
This plan, known in its formative stages as the

11

Schuman Plan,"

was the culmination of a series of earlier attempts at unifi
1
cation beginning in 1948. 7 As stated in Chapter I the Organi 
zation for European Economic Cooperation was established in
response to the Marshall Plan.

This Organization was composed

of most of the European states and was entrusted with the
function of allocating and supervising the aid received from
14
Ibid., 385.
15

Ibid., 381.

l-6
A Supranational organization is one in which a
degree of sovereignty or sovereignty within a particular
sphere is vested.
17nTreaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collabor
ation and Collective Self-Defense Between Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, Belgium, France, Luxemburg and Netherlands
The Department of State Bulletin, XVIII (May 2, 1948), 600- '
602.
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the United States.

18

The basis of cooperation was broadened

by the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948, and by a more
liberalized policy toward Germany in the London Agreement of
June, 1948.19
In August, 1948, the French and Belgium governments
called a meeting to consider the practicality of a political
tie among the signatories of the Brussels treaty.

This meeting

was held at Brussels on October 25, 1948, and merged various
efforts toward unification into a "European Movement.n

In

March, 1949, this meeting suggested a common organization of
European basic industries.20 Accordingly, two months later
on May 5, 1949, ten European countries, at the urging of

France., signed the Constitution of the "Council of Europe. r121
France's interest was twofold; to enable the collective nations
to achieve economically what no one of them could accomplish
alone, and to include Germany as insurance against further
18
Robert Ma.rjolin, Euro e and the United States in
the World Economy (Durham, Nort S Carolina, 1953), 44-45. The
states were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembo�g, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
19
Robert Schuman, "France and Europe, r, Foreign Affairs ,
lXXI (April, 1953), 351.
20
Henry L. Mason, The Euro ean Coal and Steel Community, Experiment in Supranationa !ism (The Hague, 1955), 1.
21sennholz, How Can Europe Survive, 191-192. The
original signatory governments were Belgium, Denmark, France,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. Eventually, by May, 1951, thirteen
nations, including West Germany, had joined.
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possible aggression.22
The need for a supranational coal and steel organi
zation was dramatized in early 1950 by the overproduction of
steel.

This surplus resulted from a lack of coordination in
2
Western European industry after World War rr. 3 An additional
incentive for the Coal and Steel Community was the realization
that no European country could develop an independent and
self-sufficient industry because of the interdependence of
the nations for certain basic raw materials.

Alternately,

the development of uneconomic, protected national steel could
result only in raising prices beyond the limit of the consumers'
ability to pay.

Consequently, this would reduce consumption

and prohibit an .inQrease in the standard of living.

A United

Nations study published January 3, 1950, recommended among
other things, that steel investment and production should be
coordinated throughout Western Europe and that cooperation
among the countries should insure a sufficient supply of good
quality and sheap raw material for adequate production.24
In answer to the growing demand for an alleviation of
22
u.s. Department of State, Office of Public Affairs,
The Council of Europe, 11 Foreign Affairs Outlines, n Department
of State Publication Number 4492 (Washington, 1952), 2;
Sennholz, How Can Europe Survive, 236; Schuman, !!France and
Europe, n 352.
23Mason, Coal and Steel Community, 1.
24
nstudy of Europe's Steel Production, n United Nation
Bulletin, VIII {January 15, 1950), 95-96.
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the coal and steel problems and in response also to the de
mand for some type of economic unification, Robert Schuman,
France's foreign minister, proposed on May 9, 1950, that the
entire French and German coal and steel industry be placed
under one authority, in an organization also open to the other
countries of Europe. 25
Within weeks of Schuman's proposal on June
the Korean War started.

2 5,

1950,

Although the ensuing boom alleviated

the economic fears of steel overproduction, the threat of World
War III supplied a more imperative logic to Schuman's plan for
ncreative efforts 11 leading to a trEuropean Federation.11 2 6
Schuman suggested that the object of his proposal was

11

to

remove the danger of war between rival nations and to develop
a community spirit which would not weaken national attachments . 11
This community spirit would provide
activities and new goals.h

11

a ·wider basis for new

27

The Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community,
thus implementing Schuman's plan, was drawn up and signed on
August 10, 195 2, by France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux
countries .

Since February 10, 1953, there has been a common

25

Schuman, 11 France and Europe, n 35 2 -353; Mason, Coal
and Steel Community, l; Sennholz, How Can Europe Survive-,--

237.

26

Mason, Coal and Steel Community,

27

2.

Schuman, nFrance and Europe, 11 353.
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market for coal and iron ore and since April 10, 1953, for
8
steel. 2
To implement the work of the Community, the treaty
also established several functioning organs.

These institutions

we:re the High Authority and Court of Justice.., which were endowed
with supranational powerj and the lesser ones, the Common
Assembly, the Special Council of Ministers, and Consultative
Committee which hau

delegated powers by the various countries.29

It is of paramount importance to consider the Coal and Steel
Community in the light of its supranational aspects" for it is
in this perspec�ive that the Community f'b.und its ultimate
significance.
A very important aspect of this unique development of
supranationalism was England's failure to participate.

In

regard to supranationalism England's historic attitude toward
the continent had been nbalance of power" to insure her supre
macy.

The British, understandably, viewed supranationalism

with suspicion as a threat to her former position.

Having

withstood the German blitz of World War II and because of the
traditional stability qf her own politics and economy, British
nationalism could not conceive of any higher authority.

It

was argued also that England r s preferential role and committ
ment to the Commonwealth precluded her participation.30
28

Ibid. '
---

353.

29Florinsky, Integrated Europe?, 125-126.
30ibid., 9-19; Marjolin, World Economy, 59.

30
A synthesis of the Coal and Steel Community concept
of supranationalism with the Benelux idea of the customs union,
led to the most imaginative development yet in European inte
gration in the form of the European Economic Community (EEC).
In 1954, when the European Defense Community31 failed, further
progress toward any type of unification was at a stand still,

except for the functioning of the Coal and Steel Community.32
However, at a later meeting of the foreign ministers of these
Community countries in May and June,

1

955, at Messina, Italy,

further progress on a hitherto unknown scale was projected.33
Here the Benelux nations proposed, possibly as a result of the
weaknesses of its ·customs union and in the light of the success
of the European Coal and Steel Community, a plan of unification
embracing the European transport system, civil aviation, power
production, and atomic energy.

Other minor suggestions were

made for the nharmonization n of their entire economic and

social welfare policies. 34

This nMessina Resolution n was

31unitin� Euro e, The European Community 1950-1964
(European Community Intormation Service, London, 1964), 7.
2Florinsky, Integrated Europe?, 104;
Time (June 13 , 1955),- 3 2.
3

11

Western Europe,

33

Altiero Spinelli, 11 The Growth of the European Move
ment since World War II, n in C. Grove Haines (ed.), European
Integration (Baltimore, 1-!Iaryland, 1957), 62; 11 Western Europe, 11
Time (June 13 , 1955), 30-32.
3

4E. Strauss, Common Sense About the Common Market,

Germany and Britain in-Post-War Europe (New York, 195�2;
Sydney H. Zebel, TTBri tain and West European Integration, 11
Current History, XL (January, 1961), 41.
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31
eventually adopted and committed to a study group under the
chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgium r s minister of foreign
affairs.

The final report of this committee was published
in April, 1956, in Brussels.35
This nspaak Report !! endorsed among ·other things the

supranational principle of the European Coal and Steel Com
munity and the eventual total economic unification of Western
Europe, to be achieved in degrees.

To accomplish this a cus

toms union within the Community and a 11 Common Market 11 to out
side trade was proposed.36 This report also made detailed
recommendations on the development of atomic energy.

The

significance of the reportwas that for the first time the
nebulous aspiration of total economic union had been reduced
to a workable and negotiable form for the conference table.37
The rrspaak Report, 1 1 submitted to the various countries for
adoption,was the basis for the two treaties signed on March
8
25, 1957, at Rome.3
In the first of these the EEC was for
mulated and in the second the European Atomic Energy Community,
35strauss, Common Sense, 7 °
3
36Thomas D. Cabot, Common Market, Economic Foundation
for a U.S. of Europe? A report to present in brief f'orm the
substance of the Statement on National Policy issued by the
Research and Policy Committee (May, 1959) of the Committee
for Economic Development (New York, 1959), 8.
37
38

Strauss, Common Sense, 73.

Haines, European Integration, vi.
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or EURATOM, came into existence.

The signatory countries of

each treaty were Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Nether
lands and Luxemburg, which became known as the

11

Inner Six.n39

The Common Market Treaty, a rather complex document1
was divided into six major sections, dealing respectively
with principles of the Community, foundations, policies,
association of territories, ins•ti tutions and r1 general dis
positions. rr40
While the goal was total economic union, the treaty
stipulated unification in such areas as transportation and agri
culture,witp· capital ana-labor being conducive to that end.41
The first step toward this objective was a customs union.

Tne

function of the union varied from Benelux in that it was a
means within a much larger, supranational effort while in
Benelux the customs union was the goal itself. In this set
ting it met with considerably more success.42 In the Common
Market Customs Union, the various economies were assumed to
require certain time periods for adjustment.

Hence three

periods of four years each were designated for this adjusting

39Ibid.; Cabot, Common Market, 8.

41

Strauss, Common Sense, 93; Cabot, Common Market, 8.

42
EEC, First Report,

46.

33
Delays could be effected by the member nations

process.

within limits, but the Treaty provided an absolute limit of
3
fifteen years.4
After this time goods of every type were
expected to move unhipdered across all borders and the tariff
wall to outside trade would be equal on all commodities.44
The institutions of the EEC were designed by the

Treaty to bear a marked resemblance to those of the ECSc.45
In the Common Market weak executive power reposed in the
European Commission,whereas in the ECSC the executive High
Authority was endowed with extreme supranational power.

This

European Commission was primarily responsible for the adminis
tration of the Treaty as decreed by a Council of Ministers.
This Council, relatively much stronger than the Council of the
ECS� was the real repository of supranational power in the EEC.
This shifting of power between the executive and the Council

was the outstanding organizational difference between the tw"<).46
Both organizations shared the Court of Justice and the Common
Assembly.
There was a third organ, the Economic and Social
Committee with a counterpart in the ECSC.

This body was

43Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe Political,
Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 (Stanford, California,
1958), 307.
44EEC, First
Report,· 56.
45Haas, Uniting of Europe, 306.
46Ibid., 309-310; Strauss, Common Sense, 105.
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designed to function similarly to the Consultative Committee
but was considerably larger and represented a much wider
range of interests.

One hundred and one members representing

production, agriculture, transportation, trade, labor, pro
fessions and the "general interest rr were involved.47
During the time the Rome treaties were being nego
tiateq,the six governments anticipated each organization
having a separate assembly.

Upon a suggestion by the Presi

dent of the ECSC common assembly, Hans Furler, this assembly
was subsequently dissolved to be replaced by a larger assembly
representing all three Communities.48 The Treaty provided, in
addition to these organs, a European Investment Bank capitalized
at one billion dollars.

This bank would finance those projects

too large for a national budget and those designed for under
developed areas of the Community.49
As each of the nations was willing to surrender cer
tain economic sovereigntY, they all hoped to realize commen
surate benefits.

Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg an

ticipated gains from the Common Market which they had realized
only meagerly from Benelux.

To accomplish this, little inter

nal adjustments within the fifteen year period would be neces
sary as Benelux was already based on a low tariff economy.50
47 EEC, First Report, 27-28.
48The European Parliament (Brussels, 1965), 6.
49strauss, Common Sense, 101.
50rtid., 72-73 , 85 .
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From Germany's point of view the CowJnon Market would
enable her to dominate the Community's domestic market as she
was convinced of her superior industrial efficiency and com
petitive capacity.

Italy, confronted with overpopulation and

especially a surplus labor force, saw in the Community an out
let for these ever-mounting problems.

France hoped the Com

munity would preclude the war-making capacity of Germany and
at the same time solve some pressing territorial problems.51
In the Common Market Treaty provision was made for
the admission of other nations into the Community on the same
No provision was made for an
orderly withdrawal from the Community.52

basis as the original six.

The economic significance of the EEC lay in its re
lationship to outside markets as well as its benefits to the
signatory nations.

In this global setting it could achieve

for these countries a hargaining position not obtainable by
any one nation alone.

Moreover, it could serve to stem the

rising tide of Communist economic domination.
EURATOM involved the

11

Inner Six 11 and developed out

of the same Messina-Brussels-Rome backg;ound.53

Several pres

sing long and short range problems precipitated this development
51Ibid. 84-86.
,
52Ibid., 106; :Michael A. Heilperin, r:European Integ
ration: Commercial and Financial Postulates" in Haines,
European Integration, 133; Strauss, Common Sense, 106.

53 strauss, Common Sense, 92; Haas, The Uniting of

Europe, 304.
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toward atomic union in the Community nations.

Western Europe,

because of its unique economic and military position between
Russia and the United States, early developed fears of elec
tric power shortages without some imaginative program in the
atomic power field.

Also, as Western Europe rebuilt her economy

after World War II, huge quantities of coal were being used
for the steam generation of electricity.

Atomic energy, al

though presently more expensive than coal, would be the logi
cal substitute as domestic mines were depleted.

As a Belgium

newspaper put it, wi.thout atomic energy Europe would soon be
come an nunder-developed area. 1154
In the development of EURATOM much less debate was
heard about this organization than in the case of the Common
Market.

As EURATOM was in a new area all parties agreed that

unification was highly desirable; the only minor differences
that arose concerned the implementation of the means to that
end.

France at this time conceived of EURATOM in terms of

maximum supranationalism in its institutional powers, even to
the extent of jurisdiction over atomic weapons.

The Benelux

countries and Italy shared France's position, but Germany ad
vocated a EURATOM based on international cooperation rather
than supranationalism.55

It was necessary to work out a com

promise between these two extreme positions.
54Blair Bolles, The Big Change in Europe (New York,

1958 ), , 189.

55Haas, Uniting of Europe, 279, 515, 516.
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The area of work embraced by EURAT0M covered the en
tire range of activity in the exploitation of the atom, from
mining of ore to inspection of uses.
that it would

11

The Rome Treaty provided

coordinate 1t government and private research

and undertake the more expensive projects.

It would also re
main informed on pertinent patent information.56
The EURATO:M institutional structure was that of the
Common Market with the exception of its executive department,
the five man Atomic Commission.57 This body was only quasi
executive as it was responsible for carrying out those orders
approved by the Council.

It also functioned as an advisory

body to the Council on all policy questions relating to EURAT0M.
The Commission did move independently in several technical
areas, that of directing research, procurement of ores and in-.
spection procedure. 58 Auxiliary to the Commission was a group
of three advisory committees, the Scientific and Technical
Committee, the Economic and Social Committee, and a Consultative
Committee for Research.59
Progress in EURAT0M developed quite rapidly once the
tneaty went into effect on January 1 of 1958.

The Commission's

first report on the initial nine month period showed a rather
56Ibid., 30 .
5
57EEC, First Report, 28, 29.
58Haas, Uniting of Europe, 306.
59Euratom (Brussels, 1964), 10.
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broad list of accomplishments.

During this time it had de

veloped a basic research and training program; it had inven
toried the nuclear enterprises within the Community and had
written security and health protection regulations.

Another

major step was taken shortly after this period when it signed
an agreement of cooperation ·with the United States on November
8, 1958.60
Also indicative of genuine progress was the estab
lishment of firm deadlines for actual accomplishments.

The

nuclear market provided for in the EURATOM Treaty was desig
nated to become effective January 1, 1959.61 Further pro
gress was reflected in 1959 with the opening of a research
center in Ispra, Italy.

Negotiations ·were also started for

other such centers at Karlsruhe, GermanY., and Petten, Holland..
Also, Italy cooperated with EURATOM in the building of two
atomic-electric generating stations, one at Senn, near Naple�
and another at Latina, forty-five miles south of Rome.
In spite of these notable achievements, however,
questions were raised in 1959 about the future of EURATOM.
After three consecutive mild winters and a recession, a sur
plus of thirty-f1ve million tons of coal was stockpiled in
the Community nations.

This was in contrast to a previous

annual import of fifteen million tons from the United States
60
Whaley-Eaton Service, Atoms for Peace Letter
(October 1, 1958), 2.
61 Ibid.
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prior to 1956.

Also discovery of enormous Sahara oil re

serves helped change Europe's power outlook.

In spite of the

coal surplus, which was predicted to be shortlived, EURATOM
maintained that the Community could be cut off from supplies
of oil and gas without warning, hence precititating a fuel
crisis. Then the only solution would be atomic energy.62
Because of these reasons a new policy directed toward basic
research rather than further expansion was adopted.63

This

would ultimately insure subsequent power projects based on
domestic technology.
Against this background of events leading to economic
unification, the United States shifted from a position of in
difference to actual involvement in the process itself.

Al

though no potential was seen in Benelux and other early
efforts, the United States, once convinced of the wisdom of
European unification, committed itself and much of its re
sources to that end.

The Ivla.rshall Plan and other forms of

aid lent encouragement to economic recovery and made possible
greater indigenous effort toward unification.

Success in the

Coal and Steel Community was possible; this in turn led to
the Common Market which also was directly encouraged by
American statesmen.

As a result of the successful functioning

of these organizations and EURATOM the United States at this
62

Atoms for Peace, May 27, 1959,

J.

63 Atoms for Peace, October 28, 1959, 4.
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point had assisted in bringing into existence not only a
trading partner far greater than the combined economies of
the various nations involved but also a serious potential
rival as well.

CHAPTER III
UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN COMl'.filNITY ISSUES
Relations between the United States and the European
Cornmuni ties can be.st be understood in terms of a developing
nAtlantic Cornmunity.11 1

This relationship was cemented by

the NATO Treaty and ties in business, trade, finance and
other matters of common interest between the United States
and Western Europe.

A factor that complicated this re

lationship was the fact that the European Communities were
not static but rather rapidly developing organizations.
When Robert Schuman first initiated the Schuman Plan
which subsequently developed into the first successful sup
ranational effort, official reaction in the United States
Department of State was most cordial.
it represented

11

To the United States

an e,:tperiment in new concepts of sovereignty

and of international organization which will help to knit the
free nations of the world with stronger and more enduring
ties.n2
1
George W. Ball, "The Developing Atlantic Partnership,11 Department of State Bulletin, XLVI (April 23, 1962),
667 • .
211
An Analysis of the Schuman Plan, n Department of
State Bulletin, XXIV (April 2, 1951), 528.
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The United States was keenly interested in the negoti
ations of the ECSC Treaty and considered it an important new
means by which aid might be more effectively administered. 3
By the Mutual Security Act of 1951, Congress provided for a
direct transfer of funds to the ECSC without passing through
the hands of the participating governments. 4 After the head
quarters of the High Authority was established in Luxemburg,
the United States government accredited an ambassador to it.5
Secretary of State Dean Acheson on the occasion of the inaugu
ration of the ECSC stated:
It is the intention of the United States to give the
Coal and Steel Community the strong support that its im
portance to the political and economic unification of
Europe warrants. As appropriate under the treaty, the
United States will now deal with the Community on coal
and steel matters. 6
In 1954, a one hundred million dollar loan was pro
vided and in 1956, a reciprocal trade agreement was negotiated.?
3
Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics
of the Atlantic Alliance (New York, 196 4), 119.
4u. S. Mutual Security Act of 1951, 82nd Congress,
Public Law 166 (1951).
Europe, 11

352.

511David K. E. Bruce to Serve as U. S. Observer in
Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII (March 2, 1953),

6Tlrnauguration of European Coal and Steel Community, Tr
Department of State Bulletin, XXVII (August 25, 1952), 285 • .
7TIPresident Urges U. S. Loan to Coal and Steel Com
munity," Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII (June 29, 1953),
927-928.
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American heavy industry did not view all of this aid to the
ECSC with great enthusiasm.
and competitor.

It saw in the ECSC a real rival

To alleviate these fears the government gave

assurances to American business interests that it was trying
to prevent the Community and its executive, the High Authority,
from taking courses of action detrimental to domestic pro
ducers.8
The motivating force behind American interest in the
ECSC could be explained in terms of a desire to see cooperation
develop between France a_nd Germany. 9 The government was amd..ous
to support the experiment in supranationalism because it con
tributed to the achievement of security and political object
ives. 10 In June, 1953, the House of Representatives Committee
on Foreign Affairs passed a resolution of encouragement.11

To

President Dwight D. Eisenhower it seemed nto be the most hope
ful and constructive development so far toward the economic

and political integration of Europe.n 12

Unlike the ECSC and the Common Market which had to

119-1 2 0.

8
9

119.

Cottrell and Dougherty, Politics of Atlantic Alliance,
n An Analysis of the Schuman Plan, 11 DSB, 5 24.

10

cottrell and Dougherty, Politics of Atlantic Allianc e,

1111President Urges U. S. Loan to Coal and Steel Com
munity,11 in DSB, 92 8.
12

Ibid., 92 7.
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begin by dismantling barriers of long standing between the
member states, EURATOM had practically no barriers to demolish.
Instead of attempting to unite six existing industries it had
the opportunity to spur the development of a completely new
economic sector.13
On December 10, 1956, Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles notified Paul Henri Spaak, president of the Inter
governmental Committee for the Common Market and EURATOM,
that both he and President Eisenhower offered the sympathetic
support of the United States for the Community nations to de
Dulles believed

velop an integrated atomic energy community.

that such a relationship would be mutually beneficial to the
six nations, and also to the United States.

He extended an

invitation to a Community committee of three nwise Men n to
visit the United States for inspection of certain atomic faci
lities and coordination of mutual policy.14 Specifically
they had been given the task of determining the extent to
which Europe's growing energy deficit could be met by large
scale installations of nuclear power stations.

This task was

pursuant to the same objectives which motivated President
Eisenhower's proposal before the United Nations in December,
13

EURATOM (Nancy, France, 1964), 7. This is a booklet by the European Atomic Energy Community and distributed
by the European Community Information Service, Washington,
D. C.
14 11

Letter from J. F. Dulles to Paul Henri Spaak, 11
Department of State Bulletin, XXXVI (January 7, 1957), 29.
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1953, on the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy.15
During the visit this committee reviewed with United
States officials the main items of their proposal for the
construction of nuclear power plants.

They stressed that a

large scale program for the industrial application of nuclear
power carried out within an integrated European Community
would provide new opportunity for significant cooperation be
tween the United States and Europe in the spirit of the presi
dent's natoms-for-peace 11 program.

President Eisenhower on

this occasion reiterated his strong and continued support for
European integration.

He expressed his hope that the creation

of a European Atomic Energy Community would permit the develop
ment of fruitful partnership with the United States to the
benefit of the entire free world.16 Besides customary visits
and conferences, activities of this group included inspections
of the atomic installations at Shippingport, Pennsylvania and
Oak Ridge, Tennessee.17
On November 8, 1958, the United States-EURATOM Agree
ment was signed, which provided for a joint power and a joint
research program into which both sides contributed fifty
15

nvisit of EURATOM Group, rr Department of State
Bulletin, XXXVI (February 18, 1957), 250.
16
11EURATOM Committee Proposes Fuel Program for
Euro:pe, n Department of State Bulletin, XXXVI (February 25,
1957), JOo •
. 17

nvisit of EURATOM Group," DSB, 250.

million dollars.

Under this agreement three reactors

were

built, two of these with United States financial assistance.1 8
In the area of research both sides by mid-1963 had allocated

over thirty million dollars for research.

This research in

cluded projects on the improvement of fuels and materials
and the recycling of plutonium and the treatment of radio
active waste. 19 Research projects were solicited from
American and Community nation firms and evaluated by a Joint
Research and Development Board.20
On September 25, 1963, in Brussels, the Atomic Energy
Commission signed a contract with the Supply Agency of EURATOM
providing for the nuclear fuel supply of a reactor, then under
construction near Milan, Italy.

This transaction took place
21
under the terms of the 1958 United States-EURATOM agreement.
During the seven year period after 1957, when the
Rome Treaty became effectiv�the EEC increasingly made its

existence known both in the free and Communist worlds.

This

was true generally in the economic development of the free
world and particularly in the area of tariffs, trade and agri
culture.

Within the
18EURATOM,

11

Atlantic n partnership the EEC had two

15.

19
Ibid., 20.
20
Ibid. , 22 .1
21nu.S.-EURATO.M Sign Contract,
LXVI (October, 1963), 7.
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direct and positive consequences.22

The first of these was

the reorganization of the OEEC into the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in which the
United States and Canada were full members.

Its purpose

was not just confined to Europe but was expanded to include
the development of the free world.23 The second result of
the organization of the Common Market was the passage of the
Trade Expansion Act of October 11, 1962.

From its inception

it was outlined by President John F. Kennedy to meet the
challenge of·and the trade opportunities of the Common Mar
ket.24
As Western Europe made its recovery from the effects
of World War II,there was the.belief that the OEEC was grad
ually becoming obsolete and ineffective.

The expansion of

world trade, the organization of the EEC and EFTA and the
economic recovery of Japan precipitated an entirely new set
of problems with which the OEEC had not been either intended
or designed to cope.
On November 20, 1959, the nAction Committee for the
22
nHallstein Discusses NATO And The Atlantic Alliance, 1'
Bulletin from the European Communit1, LIX (January, 1963), 10.
23
walter Hallstein, nNATO and the European Economic
Community, 1' in Lawrence Krause (ed.), The Common Market
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964), 58.
24
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United States of Europe n25 presided over by Jean Monnet,
first President of the ECSC High Authority, unanimously pro
posed a round table meeting among representatives from the
European Community, the United Kingdom, the United States and
one other non-community country selected from the 0EEC (Greece).
This committee recommended that the meeting study not only
the problems of the EEC and the EFTA, but also the major
economic problems facing the West.

Included in this proposal

were tariff arrangements, monetary stability, expansionist
economic policy and aid for underdeveloped countries. 26
This nroundtable" met in Paris in January, 1960,
within the framework of the 0EEC.

A group of four men, one

each from France, Greece, the United Kingdom, and the United
States, was appointed to prepare a report on the organizational
question.

They held discussions with representatives of the

twenty 0EEC nations, the European Communities and the 0EEC
itself.

During the spring and summer of 1960, the discussions

on the reorganization of the 0EEC were complicated by differ
ences of opinion on the solution to the European trade problem
and more fundamentally by differences on what type of European
25

The nAction Committee n was formed at the end of
195 5 to help further European unification and was composed of
the representatives of the majority of non-Communist political
parties and trade unions of the six EEC countries.
26

nMonnet Committee Proposes Atlantic Round Table,n
Bulletin from the European Community, XXXIX (January, 1960),

3.
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unity should be sought.27
In April, 1960, the group made its report and pro
duced a draft convention for an Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development {OECD).

While it had been quite

difficult to acquire unanimity as to what the basic problems
and needs wereJ there was substantial agreement on three major
points: the cooperation of Western Europe and the two associ
ated countries, i.e. the United States and Canada, should be
continued and strengthened; a turning point had been reached
and new problems had arisen; and countries with economic power
had great responsibility toward underdeveloped nations.

There

were different views on such key questions as what powers the
new organization should be given and to what extent OEEC com
mitments would remain valid.

The most basic question, how

ever, was whether there was a need for a regional economic
organization or one of developed nations cooperating to assist
the underdeveloped countries of the world.28 The latter was
selected and the OECD draft convention was submitted to the
various governments.29
The treaty of OECD actually took effect September 30,

1961, and included eighteen nations from Western Europe, the
27
Miriam Camps, Britain and. The European Community
1955-1963 {Princeton, New Jersey, 1964), 268.
28

Ibid., 268-269.

29
Kurt Birrenbach, The Future of the Atlantic Com
munity {New York, 1963), 29-JO.
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United States and Canada.

The executive branches of the

Common Market, EURATOM and the ECSC were also represented at
the treaty signingP At the Paris meeting in January, 1960,
which laid groundwork for the treaty, these executives had
participated fully in the negotiations toward this new form

of Atlantic cooperation.31

Besides providing a forum for consultation the OECD
had other objectives: the highest sustainable economic growth
and employment; a rising standard of living along with finan
cial stability; 32 sound economic expansion in all free coun
tries in the process of economic development; and the expan
sion of world trade on a multilateral, nondiscriminatory
basis.33

Just prior to its inception Jean Monnet, President

of the nAction Committee 11 of the EEC said of it:
The European Community makes it possible for the first
time to envisage a European effort for the underdeveloped
areas as a whole, not simply for some region or aspect
of them. For this reason the formation of the new
group in which the United States and Canada along with
the Common Market Commission, Britain and other main
European countries are to develop aid policies together
3o"OECD Replaces OEEC," Bulletin from the European
Community, XLIX (October, 1961), 11.

31

"The Common Market 1• (Brussels, September, 1961), 23 •
This is a mimeograph reprint of a booklet and is distributed
by the European Community Information Service, Washington,
D. C.

3 2 u.s. Department of State, American Foreign Policy,
Current Documents 1960, Publication 7624 (Washington, D. C.,
March, 1964), 333-334.
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is a step of major importance.34
Walter Hallstein, President of the EEC Commissio�had
aspirations that the 0ECD would take the first steps in a
general negotiation of economic policy with the other nations
of Europe, and increase European contributions to the under
developed nations in the entire free world.35 The United
States Secretary of Treasury, Douglas Dillo� said that in
the American opinion 1 ·the 0ECD provides to a certain degree
the means for converting common policy objectives into effec
tive action.n36
By January, 1963, the 0ECD with two centers of econo
mic polarity, the United States and EEC had formulated the
policies of spreading assistance over a number of years;
stablizing the export prices of countries' tropical goods and
raw materials; and providing opportunity for them to find
markets for these and manufactured products in the Western
world.

The EEC believed that they must not lose time in

adopting policies, common with the United States, designed
to foster the growth of developing areas as a whole.

They

further assumed the position, along with the United States,
that they must convince these areas that the West was anxious
34Jean Monnet, 11 Economic Integration: New Forms of
Partnership," in Joseph E. Johnson (ed.), Perspectives on
Peace 1910-1960 (New York, 1960), 10 4.
35walter Hallstein, nNAT0 and the European Community,n
Bulletin from the European Community (May, 1961), 5 .
36Birrenbach, The Future of the Atlantic Community, 30.
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to help, rather than dominate them. 37
During the period of 1947-1952 the United States
developed, perhaps unknowingly at the time, a device which
would become a stock-in-trade item in future foreign policy.
The :Marshall Plan was projected to thwart Communism on the
European continent by economic means and did so successfully,
at a cost calculated only in astronomical figures.

As a

result a continent arose from total destruction in less than
fifteen years, had.several organizations working toward
economic, social and political unity, and had developed aid
programs of their own.

Through the OECD, partnership on an

equal footing vrith its former benefactor was for all practical
purposes a reality for the nations of Europe.
Developments which resulted ultimately in the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962

came just as· immediately as those

which resulted in the OECD.

Within months after the Rome

Treaty became effective, the United States Congress passed
legislation extending the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
for the eleventh time, for the unprecedented period of four

years, from June JO, 1958 to June JO, 1962.3

8 This act auth

orized the president to reduce by twenty percent the existing

3711Monnett Committee Urges Europe to Speed Unity
Moves, Bulletin from the European Community (January,- 1963),
9.

11

38 James Jay Allen,

11 The European Common Market and the
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade: A Study in Compati
l?ili ty, :. in Melvin G. Shimm (ed. ) � European Regional Communi
ties (Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1962J, 216.
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American tariff rates on all pro-ducts except those affected
by the "peril point." 39 The Department of State in presenting
its case for renewal i pointed out the possibility of Common
Market discriminations against the United States.

This helped
to persuade a reluctant Congress to expedite the legislation. 4 0

'At the thirteenth session of the General Agreements on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) in 1958, a proposal was made by C. Douglas
Dillon, then United States Under-Secretary of State and Head
of the United States Delegation, that a multilateral tariff
conference be called at an early date.

This would allow the

President to make use of the powers conferred on him by the
recently passed Trade Agreements Extension Act.

The EEC ex
pressed particular interest in Dillon's proposal,41 and also
general interest in a world-wide tariff reduction.
Tariff negotiations opened in Geneva on September 1,
The first phase of these talks covered the renegotia
tion of the Community's common external tariff.42 Concessions
1960.

granted by the Community during this phase covered approximately
39John A. Birch, "The United States and the European
Common Market, 11 Department of State Bulletin, XLI (July 20,
1959), 92. European Economic Community Commission, Second
General Re ort on the Activities of the Communit --1959
Brussels, March, l 59, 3 .
40
Allen, "European Common Market and GATT, 11 in Shimm
(ed.), European Regional Communities, 216.
41EEC Commission, Second General Report--1959, 38.
4211common.Market at the Tokyo GATT Meeting," Bulletin
from the European Community, XXXIX (January, 1960 J , 5.•
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the same value of imports as the concessions previously granted
by the individual nations in their respective tariffs.

On

the basis of the Community's imports from the United States
in 1958, about 1.5 billion dollars worth of trade was affected.43
The second phase or the nnillon Round" as it was called,
opened May 20, 1961.

In this phase the Community and the

United States made further concessions on a basis of reci
procity and mutual advantage.

This represented about 1.6
billion dollars worth of trade in both directions. 44 The
Community's concessions were. 'mainly in a reducti0n of the

duties of the common tariff for items of which the United
States was the chief supplier.45 Except for certain catego
ries excluded from the across-the-board offer, in practically
all cases these reductions were in the neighborhood of the
initial Community offer of twenty percent.

Concessions were

made to the United States on about five hundred and sixty
tariff lines.46
The concessions granted by the United States to the
.
43
European Economic Community Commission Fifth General
Report on the Activities of the Community--1962 1�Brussels,
June, 1962), 236.
4411GATT Negotiations Produce Major Tariff Cuts,"
Bulletin from the European Community, LIV (June-July, 1962), 5 .
45Ibid., American products particularly benefiting
were automobiles and parts, chemicals and pharmaceuticals,
industrial and electrical machinery, textiles, canned and
preserved fruits, fats and oils.
46EEC Commission, Fifth General Report--1962, 237.
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EEC were also in the vicinity of twenty percent but were
negotiated product by product rather than on a linear basis.
They concerned about five hundred and seventy-five items
of United States tariff.47 The formal agreements were signed
at Geneva on March 7, 1962.

Even before this the EEC Com

mission had proposed that this agreement be followed by a
further round of negotiations and additional substantial
8
tariff reductions.4
On January 2 5, 1962, President Kennedy forwarded to
Congress a bill asking for powers to make drastic across
the-board, or linear, cuts in the American tariff.49 In the
accompanying message he said that the soon-to-expire Recip
rocal Trade Agreements Extension Act ''must be replaced by a
wholly new instrument.n50 The president advocated that na
new American trade initiative is needed to m�et the challenges
and opportunities of rapidly changing world economy.n5l He
also noted that since 1958, when the Trade Agreements Act
was extended, five fundamentally new and sweeping developments
47Ibid.
48uGATT Negotiations produce Major Tariff Cuts,

17

49The Facts (Brussels, September, 1962), 20. This
is a booklet distributed by the European Community Information
Service, Washington, D. C.
50nA New Foreign Trade Program, 17 Department of State
Bulletin, XLIV (February 12, 1962), 231.
51Ibid.

had made obsolete the traditional United States trade policy:
the growth of the European Common :Market; the growi.ng pres
sures of the United States balance of payments position; the
need to accelerate the domestic economic growth; the Communist
aid and trade offensive; and the need for new markets for
Japan and the developing nations. 5 2 The bill, passed by the
House in June, and the Senate in September, was signed into
law on October 11, 1962.
five year period:

It authorized the President over a

(1) To reduce tariffs by fifty percent on

broad categories of products as well as single articles;
(2) To either reduce or remove altogether in reciprocal ne
gotiations all tariffs on categories of products of which
the United States and the Common Market together provide
eighty percent or more in world trade during a repre·sentative
period; 53 (3 ) To remove the duty on any article which is sub
ject to a rate of five percent or less on July 1, 1962;
(4) To reduce or remove the duty and other restrictions on
any tropical agricultural and forestry product, provided the
Common Market does likewise and the article is not produced
in significant quantity in the United States; ( 5) To extend
adjustment assistance to firms and employees adversely affec
ted by this legislation. 5 4
52
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Ibid., 23 1-232.

This stipulation anticipated the entrance of Great
Britain into the Common Market as there were but a limited
number of instances where this occurred otherwise.
54u. S. Congress, Senate, Problems and Trends in
Atlantic Partnership I, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Document
No. 13 2 (September 14, 1962), 4-5.
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The Trade Expansion Act provided the President with
essentially four types of new tariff authority: authority to
reduce tariffs in relation to any other country; special re
ciprocal authority to reduce or eliminate duties in relation
to the EEC; special authority to reduce or eliminate tariff
in relation to the less developed countries; and authority

to eliminate low tariffs. 55

It was"a revolutionary change
in 150 years of American attitude. to�ard the tariff."56
The EEC Commission was particularly pleased with the

Trade Expansion Act and viewed it as an important step to
ward international economic relations as well as political
relations.

To them it was an opportunity to move toward

the realization of an uAtlantic Partnership." 57

In a re

solution dated March 27, 1963, the European Parliament wel
comed the initiative taken by the United States.

It con

sidered that for the satisfactory functioning of an Atlantic
partnership it was necessary "to lay down a number of com
mon rules in order to remove or to prevent any distortion of
trade and disturbance of markets which might result.n58

551eonard Weiss, "The New Trade Expansion Act"

Department of State Bulletin, XLVI (February 26, 1962j, 340343.
56J. Robert Schaetzel, "The Common Market, the Atlantic
Partnership and the Free World, 11 Department of State Bulletin,
XLVII (October 29, 1962), 662. -

57European Economic Community Commission, Sixth

General Re ort on the Activities of the Communit --196
9 3 , 247.
Brusse
58Ibid.
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The series of GATT tariff negotiations which were
the outgrowth of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 were known
as the nKennedy Round.n

These differed from the Dillon Round

in that the later negotiations were on a linear basis rather
than an item-by-item basis as was true in the earlier ones.59
This item-by-item approach seriously hampered the American
negotiators1. and the Europeans complained that the Round was
not as productive as

:L±· -

would have been had the Americans
This was particu

been able to negotiate on a linear basis.

larly tedious to the EEC negotiators who had to reconcile the
60
positions of the six member states.
At the GATT negotiations the major goal sought by
the United States was a sizable reduction of the common ex
ternal tariff of the Common Market.

The United States line

of reasoning was that as a condition for this reduction all
nations of the free world outside of the
reduce their tariffs also.

11

Six'' would in turn

Not only would this increase

trade between the United States and the EEC,it would increase
These countries
in turn would be able to import more from the United States.61

Japanese and Latin American sales to Europe.

5911Linear': refers to a percentage approach applied
to broad categories rather than an "item-by-item" approach.
60 u.
S. Congress, Senate,Problems and Trends in
Atlantic Partnershi II, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Document
� , .
No. 21 (June 17,193)
40
61Lawrence B.
Krause, 11 The Common Market,Progress
and Controversy,rr in Leonard B. Krause (ed.),The Common
Market (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964),24.

59
The major inducement offered to the Common Market in
return for their reductions was a similar reduction by the
United States.

The most promising indication that the Common

Market would lower its common external tariff and advocate
liberal trade policies was found in the provisions for admin
istering the Rome Treaty.

These provisions were designed so

that with the passage of time the policies of the EEC would
benefit the Community as a whole rather than the individual
member states.

62

Senator Estes Kefauver, chairman of the

Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, told the Senate that
the Common Market antitrust officials were determined that
international tariffs and quotas soon to be abolished during
the Kennedy Round in GATT would not be replaced by cartels
and other private restrictions.63 The accumulative result
of all of this would be wide liberalization of trade.

This

would assist the United States to meet the economic challenge
of the EEc.64
The concrete problems which the United States and
the Common Market were attempting to solve in the Kennedy
Round were two-fold: problems connected with trade in manu
factured goods and problems dealing with agricultural products.

DSB, 91.

62

Birch,
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The U. S. and the European Common Market,

63 rru.
S. Senators Reassured on EEC Competition Policy,
European Community, LXII (June, 1963).
64
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In the area of manufactured goods, there were three major
topics to be discussed: the general principle of tariff dis
mantling and the exceptions to this principle; the problems
concerned with disparities; and non-tariff barriers and other
obstacles with the equivalent effect of customs duties. 6 5
As to which industrial goods would be included in the tariff
negotiations all of the negotiating parties ·wanted extensive
tariff disarmament.

The proposed working hypothesis was a
There was also

linear reduction of duties by fifty percent.

an extreme proposal that the process of completely abolishing
all tariffs within GATT be instituted, but the United States
State Department considered it "constitutionally and psy
chology out of range.11 66
A second problem dealing with manufactured goods
that needed attention was that of disparities.

This pro

blem arose when the hypothetical reduction of fifty percent
was applied to tariffs of sixty and twenty percent.

In the

first case of sixty percent, there would still remain sub
stantial protectio�while in the case of twenty percent re

latively little protection would persist.67
65

Viewed on a

walter Hallstein, '1 The European Economic Community
and the United States of America n (February 4, 19 6 5), 8.
This is a mimeographed copy of an address delivered before a
conference on Europe, America and World Trade, at Amsterdam
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66Ibid., 9.
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graph the tariff structure of the United States appeared as
a series of peaks and troughs.

There were a large number

of items covered by duties in the five percent range; there
were quite a few above thirty percent; some were above fifty
percent and even a few were above one hundred percent.

The

graphed tariff of the EEC would appear as an undulating line
varying between fifteen and twenty-five percent.
Because of the complicated and inconsistent nature of
the two systems it was impossible to precisely compare them,
except that they both provided generally the same monetary
level of protection. 68

To solve this problem of disparity,

higher tariff goods would have to be lowered more percentage
wise than low tariff goods.69
The third problem in manufactured goods to·be dealt
with by the Kennedy Round was that of the complex non-tariff
barriers and other equivalent obstacles such as discrimination
on grounds of nationality, state aids, dumping and cartels.
Dr. Walter Hallstein �xpressed the European point of view:
We therefore regard it as an important test of the
liberal attitudes of those taking part with us in the
negotiations that, when the mutual readiness of countries
to open their markets is being accessed and bargained
over, these forms of trade barrier should be dealt with
at the same time as customs duties themselves.70
His proposed solution to the problem of barriers involved

68
69

Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership II, 41.
Hallstein,

70ibid.

11

EEC and U. S. A. , 11 12-13 •
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the following: dumping must be ruled out; import and export
cartels must not hinder trade; national aids such as tax
preferences must not replace dismantled customs duties;
foreigners must be allowed to bid on public contracts; no
new measures must be introduced that could potentially re
strict competition; unilateral retaliation against measures
besides customs duties must not be adopted without prior con
sultation and the use of methods to divide goods into groups
in the tariff nomenclature to assess the customs value of
these goods must be guarded.71
As to the world-wide problem of agriculture, the
Kennedy Round offered to the trading nations of the world an
opportunity to work out a basic solution.

Briefly stated,

the problem consisted of surpluses mounting under highly
developed, subsidized programs of agriculture in. the more
advanced nations on one hand, and acute shortages and hunger
in underdeveloped countries on the other.

This problem was

further handicapped by the lack of potential buying power in
such nations.

Officials of the EEC and the United States

considered the solution to the problem to be in the area of
agricultural and development policy rather than in the field
of trade policy and tariffs.

As agricultural commodities con

stituted thirty percent of world trade, it was proper that
the Kennedy Round confront the problem.

This round of ne

gotiations covered the entire range of agricultural products
71Ibid.
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and was attended by the main exporting and importing cou�tries.
In accordance with the Trade Expansion Act the approach to
these negotiations was shifted from the traditional selective
principle to the across-the-board principle, which meant that
all of the contracting parties in GATT accepted commitments
2
with respect to every agricultural product.7
Also the
Kennedy Round established the principle of reciprocity thus
indicating that each of the contracting parties to the agree
ment must accept equivalent commitments for each agricultural
product.
At the onset of the Kennedy Round, the United States
was interested in negotiating deep and equal linear tariff
reductions.

In 1963, foreign export accounted for only four

percent of the United States' gross national product.

By

increasing this percentage, particularly by an improvement
in the Community, the United States hoped to bring its inter
national account into better balance.

In this same year

the EEC accounted for only seventeen percent of American
exports.

The United States position was shared by some of

the larger trading nations including Great Britain.

Within

the Common �Iarket Germany and Benelux countries were also
generally in accord.

France had no major interest in deep

linear cuts and viewed the matter in political as well as
economic terms.

Italy's position, somewhat ambiguous, fell

72Ibid. 15.
,

between that of France and Germany.73
One of the strongest expressions of the political
and economic reality of the Common Market was that the
United States rather than dealing with six individual nations
·was dealing now with the Community represented by the Com
mission.74 Prior to the enactment of the Trade Expansion
Act of .1962, problems in the area of agriculture were al
ready well developed.

After the Dillon Round, the United

States was dissatisfied with the extent of tariff dismant
ling in agriculture.

Interim arrangements, seeking to pro

tect the existing American trade position and providing for
future negotiations to develop more exact committments for
acces� were worked out in the sectors of wheat, corn, grain,
sorghtun, poultry and rice.75 Vnited States problems were
complicated further when the EEC Council of r,Iinisters on
January 14, 1962, ratified the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP).76 This was a merging of the six separate national
73Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership II, 41.
74Hans-Broder Krohn, 11 Lectures by Dr. Hans-Broder
(April 23-24, 1964), 1. This is a mimeographed copy
of a series of addresses on the Common Market delivered at
the Kansas State University, Manhattan, Kansas, and distri
buted by the European Community Information Service, Washing
ton, D. C.
Krohn 11

75Leonard Weiss, 11The Common Market and United States
Agriculture, 11 Department of State Bulletin, XLVI (June 25,
1962), 1035.
76The United States and Europe's Common Market for
Agriculture (Washington, D. C., January, 1904), 14. This is
a booklet distributed by the European Community Information
Service, Washington, D. C.
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agricultural programs into a Community-wide program.77
These countries had farm problems similar to those in the
United States and each one had a complex set of price supports,
subsidies, and regulations to deal ·with its farm problems.78
Generally the objectives of the program were: to balance
supply and demand both within the EEC and in its external
trade; to secure a fair wage.for producers; to stabilize
agricultural markets; to enable the consumers to enjoy the
price and quality advantages of efficient production and
marketing.79 Under this plan European agriculture was or
ganized according to two major principles.

For most products

including grains, pork, eggs and poultry, all national pro
tective devices were replaced by levies at the Community
frontier.

For other products including fruits, vegetables

and wine, quality controls and ad valorem customs duties
80
. d.
were devise
The inauguration of the CAP by the EEC had consider
able impact on American agriculture.

The United States ex

pressed the hope that the CAP would take into account the
77nu. S. Exchange Tariff Concessions with GATT Con
tracting Parties,n Department of State Bulletin, XLVI (April
2, 1962), 561.
78 u. S., Congress, Agricultural Policies in the
European Common Market Countries, 87th Congress 2nct73ession
"'[August 29, 1962), iii.
79u. S. and Europe I s Common Market for Agriculture, 14..
BO Ibid., 15.
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importance of agricultural commodities in the overall pattern
of free world trade and the interest of the United States
and other agricultural exporting countries.81 Even before
the adoption of the policy, increased farm production within
the EEC began to challenge certain American lfiarkets in Western
Europe, particularly in poultry, wheat, fruits and vegetables. 82
There were a number of reasons for this increase in production,
but one of the most important was -the technological revolution
in agriculture.

Because Europe was undergoing a tremendous

growth in agricultural productio� it was normally expected
that she would become more self sufficient and less dependent

on outside sources, including the_ United States, for supplies. 83

Generally this was a trend that would have existed anyway, but
it was accentuated by the CAP.84 It aimed specifically at
a structural reorganization of its agriculture, involving com
mon pricing and the levying of a common external tarifr.85
In the face of these developments the United States
countered with these two objectives: to secure reductions in
81
u. S., Department of State, American Foreign Policy,
Current Documents 1961, Publication No. 7808 (Washington, D.
C., June, 1965), 511.
82
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the common external tariff which would increase trade between
the United States and the EEC and to guarantee that the CAP
tzke into consideration the interests of the American agri

86
cultural exporters.

United States Secretary of Agriculture

Orville L. Freeman projected several principles which reflected
American thinking on the future of United States-EEC agricul
tural relations.

He emphasized the need for trading arrange

ments in a global setting and the phasing out of preferences
over a reasonable period of time.

He believed that this trade

was needed in as wide a range of agricultural commodities as
possible and should be regulated by a moderate fixed tariff.
Another principle he emphasized was the need for nations and
economic groups to develop agricultural income support pro

grams so as not to interfere with normal patterns of trade.87
The Common Market did respond out of necessity to some of the

pressures caused by the United States price support program
and export subsidy policies.

These in turn were designed to

cope with the problem of domestic overproduction of certain
farm commodities.

These policies made it difficult for Euro

pean producers to compete and also many of the traditional
European export markets were adversely affected by the non
commercial distribution of American surpluses abroad.

The

CAP was supposed to enable an efficient farm to realize a

86 nu. S. Exchanges Tariff Concessions, 1 7 DSB, 561.
8711EEC Agriculture Policy Draws U. S. Attention, 11
Bulletin from the European Community, LVIII (December, 1962), 5.
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reasonable income while at the same time avoid structural
surpluses which were so troublesome to the government of the
United States.

88

In 1963, the EEC was the world's largest market for
agricultural goods and bought about one-third or 1.2 billion

8
dollars worth of United States farm exports. 9

Approximately

one-third of this amount including cotton and oil seed entered
duty free.

An equal amount was subject to fixed duties and

included tobacco, vegetables, oils, and canned fruit.

The

United States expected that these could be dealt with under
the authority of the Trade Expansion Act as normal tariff
items.

The other third, including grains, pork, eggs and

poultry were subject to the variable levy system and was an
area of critical concern to the United States.

Before the

Kennedy Round began, the United States wanted to reach a
standstill agreement with the EEC on these products covered
by this variable levy.90 Above and beyond this there was the
belief that if the United States was to cooperate with these
countries of the EEC in the formation of an Atlantic Community
the agricultural policies of the Common Market and the United

88
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89

Agricultural Policies in the European Common Market
Countries, iii.
90
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States must be harmonized.91
At the end of July, 1962, when the first Community
trading regulations became effective several internal trade
restrictions disappeared.

As the CAP developed, others such

as import quotas, grain mixing, regulations and state trading
were expected to end.92 United States exporters justly feared
that this might have an adverse effect on American trade be
cause the CAP provided for trade barriers other than just
normal duties or tariffs.

They took the form of national

arbitrary assessments, variable levies and system of nsluice
gate prices.1193
The heart of the CAP was a variable levy system which
in July, 1962, superseded tariffs, quantitative restrictions
and all other forms of protection for grain, pork and poultry
products.

This system varied from product to product; but

generally it sought to protect the agriculture of a member
state from competition from more efficient producers both in
side and outside the Community.
The nsluice-gate rr price v,ras a protective device which
stipulated a minimum price below which products were not al
lowed to enter.

The exporter either guaranteed this minimum

91

Agricultural Policies in the European Common T"farket
Countries, iii.
92
93

Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership II, 36.

U.S., Congress, Senate, Statement on Im act of Common Market Regulations on E ort of United States poultry,
88th Congress, 1st Session ryFebruary 5, 1963), 12.
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or else the importing state raised the import charges to this
required level.

The gate price was calculated on the basis

of production costs and was uniform throughout the Community.
It served to protect the domestic market from dumping and
lower costs resulting from more efficient production.94
In 1963, German protection against imports of American
poultry was raised to a prohibitive forty percent.95 This in
cluded an arbitrary assessment of 2.84 cents per pound which
was designed to offset certain competitive advantages. 96
Actually the import charges were raised from thirteen cents
to fourteen and one-quarter cents.

The EEC Council at the

time of its decision had before it an alternate proposal,
recommended by the EEC Commission, to lower the gate price
and levy by almost two cents.97 This increase was effective
June 10, 1963, but did not apply to countries within the
Common Market, and even certain other countries received
favored treatment, e.g., the gate price was not binding on
8
poultry imports from Denmark.9

36-37.

94Problems and Trends in Atlantic Partnership II,
95Ibid. , 37.
96
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Import Fees,n Department of State Bulletin, XLVIII (June 24,
1963), 997.
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This market accounted for about eighty-five percent
of United States poultry imports into the Community nations
and amounted to a total of 50 million dollars in 1962.99

The

United States deplored the decision of the EEC Council and
made it clear that action in this direction would compel it
to change the type of approach that had been followed.

Under

the protocol signed with the EEC at the close of the Dillon
Round, the United States retained the negotiating rights it
had on poultry as of September 1, 1960.

In invoking these

rights the United States served notice that it would balance
compensation elsewhere in its trade exchanges. 100

During the

first week in August, 1963, Secretary of State Christian
Herter listed nineteen items, which represented products from
lOl on wh.1ch tar1·
· countries,
·
a11 six
·rf concessions
.
wou 1d be
withdrawn.

This was to become effective in mid-October,

which gave the EEC Council time to rescind its action.

Several

hours after the announcement, the EEC Commission in Brussels
protested that the scale of retaliation went beyond United
States rights. 102

99
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On August 6, Jean Rey, the member of the Common
Market Commission for external relations, expressed regret
concerning the impending retaliation measures.
In computing the amount of damage, the United States
used as its base the total Poultry export to the Community
in 1960 which was 23 million dollars and added a growth fac
tor of 100 percent.

The Community used the 1959 figure of

12.8 million dollars and added a growth factor of only 50
percent.

The difference of opinion was then between 46 mil
103
lion and approximately 19 million dollars.
In September,

196� the EEC Council of Ministers gave the Commission auth
ority to "end the dispute 11 by offering to reduce the levy
by 1.3 cents per pound.
of the Council.

The United States rejected this offer

Christian Herter, then the president's

Special Representative for Trade Negotiation, stated that
the proposed reduction would be insufficient to restore

10
reasonable access for Amer�can poultry to the Common Market. 4
The disagreement over the correct total was submitted to
GATT for arbitration as it stemmed from a difference of in
terpretations of GATT regulations.105 These arbitration
arguments centered on the degree of damage suffered by United
10311
EEC Council Considers Poultry Question, 11 EC, 1.
104
11Poultry Dispute Still Unresolved," European Com
munity, LXVI (October, 1963), 2.
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States poultry exporters since damage itself had been conceded
by the EEc.106 The retaliation measures set for mid-October
were postponed pending the arbitration decision.
On November 22, . 1963, the advisory panel of GATT put
the amount at 26 million dollars which was accepted by both
parties.107 In December, 1963, the Common Market Commission
had been expected to propose measures to compensate for the
United States loss.108 On December 4, President Lyndon B.
Johnson signed a proclamation raising tariffs on EEC farm
imports as of January 7, 1964.10 9 During the course of the
rrchicken-war 11 negotiations, as it was called, the question
arose concerning the toughness of American policy since 46
million dollars was only a very small percentage of the 1 .25
billion dollar market in the Community.110 Although United
States poultry imports was the only aspect of the CAP to give
rise to such a dispute between the EEC and a non-member country111
106

Peter Hendr¥, nThe Chicken War Stew, rr Reporter,
XXIX (November 7, 1 963), JO.
l07
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108
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there were those who believed that poultry was to be but
the first of a series of similar problems as the CAP devel
oped.112 In a statement before the United States Senate
Committee on Finance on February

5, 1963, Victor Pringle,

General Manager of the Rockingham Poultry Marketing Cooper
ative of Rockingham, Virginia stated:
Poultry is but a symbol of a far-reaching problem. It
has been the first to feel the lash of the Common Market's
protectionist agricultural policy. But other measures
are already being readied to be applied against other
important agricultural exports items. The trade problems
confronting us in agriculture as a result of these Com
mon Market measures are so serious that time i§ overdue
for plain talk and firm and decisive action. l�j
Added to this was the fact that EEC agriculture in becoming
more modern was becoming more efficient as well.

Complicating

the matter was the fact that the inter-community tariffs on
agriculture were lower than the common external tariff and
This combination spelled
trouble for the American agricultural exporter.114

would eventually be eliminated.

One of the most critical periods in the drive for
European unity occurred on January 29, 1963, when France,
in the person of President Charles DeGaulle, exercised its
veto to cancel Britain's bid to join the EEC.
112

11-12.

The United

Hendry, nchicken War Stew,'; Reporter, JO.

113
statements on Impact of Common Market Regulations,
114
Hendry, rrchicken War Stew, 11 Reporter, JO.

75
States advocated the entry of the United Kingdom into the
Common Market,

Because of the circumstances under which

these negotiations were broken off, both the United States
and Britain suffered considerable loss of face.

In so far

as the United States was concerned it had failed to achieve
its desired and announced purpose and the State Department
was generally disappointed and embarrassed by this turn of

events. 115

In an analysis of the situation with respect to the

future of relations with European nations generally and EEC
in particular, the State Department maintained that the basic
facts of ttAtlantic life t . had not been materially changed by
the crisis, which at least served to underscore the need for
more cooperation toward European unity.

Briefly stated, these

basic facts were: Europe is unable to defend itself; the
nuclear defense of the free world is indivisible; the great
industrial countries of the North Atlantic are economically
interdependent; this interdependence demands a free flow of
trade and the urgent needs of the newly developed nations

require combined assistance from the major free world powers. 116
United States policy toward Europe was not materially altered
by France's veto, but remained consistent with the unchanged

115Quincy Wright, nThe Projected

Union and
American International Prestige, in Thorsten Sellin (ed.),
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, CCCXLVIII (July, 1963), 133-134..
17
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116 George W. Ball, : 1 rmplications for U. S. of Break

down in U. K. - EEC Negotiations, r: Department of State Bulletin,
XLVIII (March 18, 1963), 414-415.
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basic facts of HAtlantic life. 11

In March, 1963, this policy

was redefined by Under Secretary of State George W. Ball:
First, we shall continue to encourage the development of
European unity and to express the hope that arrangements
may ultimately be made for the accession of Great Britain
to full membership in the EEC • • • • Second, we shall
seek to advance the arrangements for close economic cooper
ation with Europe through the OECD. . • • Third, we shall
continue to work toward the strengthening of NATO and the
development of adequate conventional forces in Europe • .
Fourth, we intend to utilize to the fullest the powers
granted to the President under the Trade Expansion Act
in order to improve access to the European Common Market
as well as other majQr world markets for products of U. S.
farms and factories.��7
Disappointment was equally strong within the EEC
organization.

In June, 1961, when the British government

was pondering Common Market membership, President Hallstein
of the EEC Commission stated:
An expanded EEC undoubtedly would present increased
economic competition for the United States. • • . It
seems quite logical therefore that the United States
should ask its friends in Europe to balance this competition with a solid contribution to political unity.118
After negotiations were severed in January, 1963, he declared
that at the Atlantic level the Community organization sought,
in agreement with American policy, to replace the system of
a giant United States negotiating with a series of nEuropean
national dwarfs" with a partnership of equals.119
117u.
S., Department of State, Foreign Affairs Outline:
European and British Commonwealth Series 65, Publication No.
7518 (March, 1963), 3.
118r:u. K. Ponders Common Market Membership,n Bulletin
from the European Community, XLVII (June, 1961), 1.
119rrsuspension of U. K.-Community Negotiations: Com
munity Executives Speak Out, i : Bulletin from the European Com
munity, LX (February, 1963), 8.
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During the period 1957-1963, United States relations
with the Common Market generally followed the same policies
that originally led the United States to encourage unification.
The closeness of economic ties between the United States and
the EEC was a culmination of events which began with the
Marshall Plan.

Trade in this instance was one-sided, but as

Europe gradually regained economic potential it developed on
a partnership basis.

As this occurred American interest

shifted from predominantly military to economic as well.

CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INTEREST IN
EUR0PEAN ECONOMIC UNIFICATION
Official United States policy since World War II has
been one of g�neral support for close economic and political
ties among the nations of Western Europe.1 By the time the
six nations entered the negotiating stages for the EEC, basic

American policy on the issues had already been well developed.2

Congress in authorizing the European Recovery Program in 1948
made it clear that the United States government was in favor
of European unity.

This legislative act declared it 1 'to be

the policy of the people of the United States to encourage
these European countries through their joint organization,
to exert sustained common efforts to achieve speedily that
economic cooperation in Europe which is essential for lasting peace and prosperity.n3 In May, 1949, Secretary of State
Dean Acheson declared that nthe progressively closer political
1
Elmer W. Learn, World Trade, What Are The Issues,
No. 4: The European Common Market, 4.
2uu. S. Views on European Common Market and Free
Trade Area,n Department of State Bulletin, XXXVI (February 4,
1957), 1 8 2.
3 u. S., Foreign Assistance Act of 1948, 80th Congress,
Public Law 472 (1948).
78
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,

integration of the free nations of Europe will insure that
the economic cooperation which has resulted from the European
Recovery Program will not wane, but on the contrary, will be
come even closer and more enduring.n4
In December, 1951, the United States Department of
State advocated four reasons for the unification of Western
Europe: it was the only prospect for world peace; it was the
only reasonable prospect for lasting European freedom; it con
stituted the means of raising the European standard of living;
and finally, it was the only means of assuring a favorable
American interest within Europe.5 According to the legis
lation itself the Mutual Security Act of 1952 was to be rrso ad
ministered as to support concrete measures for political
federation, military integration and economic unification
in Europe.1t 6
In January, 1957, before the signing of the Rome
Treaty in March, 1957, an economic report of the President
to Congress noted two promising moves then under study which
would further the economic integration of Europe.

The first

�- I.Need

For Closer Unity Among Free Nations of Europe, r,
Department of State Bulletin, XX (May 22, 1949), 6 64.
5
John J. McCloy, 11 The Future of Germany within the
European Community� 11 Department of State Bulletin,XXV
(December 31, 1951J, 105r:-·

6U. S.,
Mutual Security Act of 1952, 82nd Congress,

Public Law 400 {1952).
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was the establishment of a Common Market without internal
trade barriers and the second was the association of the
United Kingdom with these countries and other countries
of the continent in a free trade relationship.

The report

expressed the belief that should these moves be brought to
a constructive conclusion they would add much to the grovring
economic strength and political unification of the area 1--.r.i.th
substantial benefits to the United States and the entire
free world. 7 Specifically, in the energy sector it noted
that the continued industrialization of Western Europe re
quired the expansion of economical sources of power.

Because

members of the ECSC were planning cooperative efforts in the
field of atomic energy, action should be taken by Congress
to authorize full participation by the United States in the
work of the International Atomic Energy Agency of the United
Nations.

Such action extending the United States program

was said to be appropriate if the peaceful benefits of atomic
energy were to help the free world.8
Since its international aims were already a well set
precedent through the rfl.arshall Plan, the OEEC and the NATO,
the United States could only view the organization of the
Common Market with favor if not outright enthusiasm.9 In a
71'The International Economic Situation, r. Department
of State Bulletin, XXXVI (February 11, 1957), 224-225.
8Ibid.
91.u. S. Views on European Common Market, 11 DSB, 182.
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summary of views which were communicated to the governments
concerned in January, 1957, the UnitedStates State Depart
ment declared:
The attitude of the UnitedStates with respect to
current Western European proposals for a common market
and free trade area is determined by two traditional
policies of the U.S. Government: our consistent support
of moves to further the political and economic strength
and cohesion of Western Europe within an expanding Atlantic
community and our longstanding devotion to progress toward
freer nondiscriminatory ultilateral trade and conver
tibility of currencies.l�
This same communication also elaborated on certain aspects of
the Common Market agreement which would be of particular
interest to the American government.
the matter of agriculture.

The first of these was

Because of surplus food problems

and the fact that the United States was an exporting nation
in this sector, the European market for agriculture was im
portant. Should the internal Common Market tariff wall drop,
as it surely would, and should the external tariff wall to
outside trade be raised, which was a real possibility, then
agricultural imports from the United States would decline.11
A second interested area in relation to the American
economy was the measures, both public and private, which
bear on international trade.

All six EEC states were in

GATT, it was possible to assume that any import restrictions
l

Oibid.

11

Ibid. Another factor bearing on this issue was the
role of the African nations "associated 11 with the EEC. These
were generally former colonies and were.given certain tariff
concessions particularly in the agricultural sector.
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placed by the six participating countries would be consistent
with its provisions.
A third area of interest to the United States was the
liberalization of import controls affecting dollar goods.
The progress which Western Europe had made in recent years
in liberalizing imports from the United States was encouraging
and hope was expressed that circumstan.ces under a Common Market
would permit this progress to continue. 12
This same communication also noted that n a European
common market based on provisions which hold the promise of
obtaining this objective will have the support of the United
States.u 1 3 This was stated to be consistent with U. S. sup
port .of such arrangements as GATT and the Articles of Agree
ment of the International Monetary Fund, both of which had
as their objective the expansion of non-discriminatory multi
At this time England had decided to associate

lateral trade.

itself vr.i. th the Common Market countries in a TTFree Trade Area 1.
arrangement.

This association could further strengthen the

unity of the Atlantic Community and the entire free world.
The United States hoped that such Free Trade Area arrangements
as may be concluded among the proposed Common Market, the
United Kingdom and other OEEC countries would also encourage
the expansion of international trade from which all of the
free world countries would benefit.14
12Ibid.
lJibid.
14Ibid.
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Although many of the gains made by the Common Market
would be at the expense of the United States, the goverILment
supported it because she was convinced of the importance of
an integrated Europe.

The basis of United States policy to

ward European unification was well established in that there
were certain dominant aims that could be achieved by having
an economically strong Europe.

Among these were the fact

that, militarily speaking, the only good ally is a strong
ally and that economic unification vmuld strengthen the mem
ber states.

Conversely, and equally important was the cer

tainty that a group of small, weak European states, unwilling
or unable to accept economic burdens would become a liability
to the United States.15
On the other hand a strong and unified Europe could
achieve a high degree of economic responsibility.16 Europe
then would have the capacity to participate in assistance
programs toward underdeveloped countries, to become more
active in solving currency and commodity problems, and ac
celerate liberalization of international trade and flow of
capital.

Specifically, any appreciable increase in European

prosperity would tend to increase the demand for United States
exports.17
15Lawrence B. Krause, TrThe Common Market: Progress
and Controversy, 11 in Lawrence B. Krause (ed.), The Common
Market (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964), 6.
16Ibid.
17 Joseph D. Coppock, 11 The European Economic Community
and United States Trade Policy,'' Department of State Bulletin,
XLVI (May 7, 1962), 773.
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While the United States openly and energetically
supported the Common Market officially, there were risks
involved for American interests in the development of a major
economic power in the free world.

Generally, these risks

were of commercial and political nature.

Commercially, the

risk was that there was the possibility that the Common
Market might grow· to the extent that not only would trade
from the United States diminish, but also the Common Market
would become a competitor in exports with the other trading
There were several reasons, however,
v;hy this probably would not develop.18 More efficient pro
nations of the world.

duction and expanded economic activity resulting from EEC would
� increase demand, thereby making it possible for Europe to in
crease the total volume of United States trade.

It was be

lieved that a single market, free of internal restrictions
would offer opportunities for American capital and experience
to assist in building Europe's economic future.19
In addition to the commercial risks involved there
were also political risks to be considered, specifically,
the possibility that an integrated Europe might assume free
world political ascendency over the United States.

The decided

opinion of the State Department was that since the essence of
18

Fredrick W. Jandrey, ::united Europe: A Strong
Partner, 1' Department of State Bulletin, XXXVIII (March 10,
1958), 388.
19Ibid. , 38 .
9
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our foreign policy is to preserve American prestige and se
curity, it was necessary to have strong allies such as would
develop in the Common Market.20 A noted German historian,
Hubertus zu Lowenstein, expressed the same concept:

i.A strong

France in peace and friendship with England and Germany is
the very basis for American defense of. Europe.u 21
Because of the commercial disadvantages posed by the
Common Market, various avenues of adjustment to a large
t�riff-free and quota-free market were explored.

Foremost

in the thinking of many American companies in this period of
adjustment was the probability of increasing their investment
and expanding much of their production capability -within the
Common Market itself.

These and other adjustments were be

lieved to be easier should they occur during a period of
much economic activity rather than a time of recession.

At

this point the United States government was in a position
to alleviate many of the problems of American business in
terests if it insured that the common tariff was as low as
possible and if it worked for the rectification of any ano
malies which might develop in rates on specific comrnodities.22
20
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Many of the decisions and policies of the Common
Market would be formulated by groups and organizations not
yet in existence.

These bodies, once organized, would have

the future of the whole of Europe in mind rather than the in
dividual state.

It was believed by the United States Depart

ment of State that Europe 1 s best interests were served by
increased trade with the outside world.

The Department also

believed that the direction of the Common Market depended
to a marked degree on the actions and policies of its trading
partners, including the United States.

Conditions for this

were an atmosphere of expanding world trade which in turn
depended on a continuing liberal trading policy by the United
States.2 3
Because of the advantages projected, there was very
little substantial criticism of United States policy toward
Critics argued that an increase in Euro

the Common Market.

pean economic power would not automatically mean an increase
in responsibility.
interests.

It could be used to further various self

They also argued that even if political unity was

finally achieved the new State could become more competitive
·than cooperative with the United States.

A military approach

Gritical of unification presented the problem of contingencies
which might arise requiring immediate joint action without
time for consultation.24
23 Jandrey, TTUnited Europe : A Strong Partner, 11 DSB, 89 .
3
24Krause,

11

Common Market,

n

7.

In addition to the advantages and disadvantages of
European economic unification as projected by various groups
and individuals in the United States, the Common Market pre
sented a series of challenges of an international nature that
could not be ignored.25 From the economic viewpoint, the
initial challenge was presented to United States exporters
as they tried to market goods in EEC.

Because the United

States was the largest single exporter, tariff discriminations
Consequently, the loss of

were bound to affect this trade.

competition further weakened an already unsatisfactory balance
of payments.

The second challenge to the United States economy

was indirect in that it affected third countries, particularly
those in Latin America.

In accordance with the agreement be

tween the EEC and its African associate countries goods and
products from these nations were favored over those from Latin
26
This loss of trade by Latin America reduced their
America.
capacity to import from the United States, its chief supplier
of imported goods.

Therefore the United States was faced

with the possible alternative of losing export trade or being
forced to increase economic assistance merely to sustain the
Latin American economy at its previous export level.

This pro

blem, too was heightened by Communist activity in Latin America.
25
u. S., Department of State, American Foreign Policy,
Current Documents 1961, Publication 78081Washington, D. C.,
June, 1965), 528.
26
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A third economic challenge came from the inducement that the
European countries offered to American business for direct
investment.

The level of this investment had risen from ap

proximately 200 million dollars per year before 1957 to
800 million dollars per year average in 1960-1962.

While

this investment was not excessive it could become disadvan
tageous if it were at the expense of domestic expansion.
Politically the Common Market was a potential threat
to United States leadership in the free world to the extent
that it was able to develop political unity.

The United

States had officially advocated this realizing all the time
that it allowed commensurate responsibility and freedom of
action.

Europe if strong enough could eclipse American leader

ship.27
The United States reaction to these challenges was
to assume a world point of view.

'While the development of

regional trading blocs reversed the trend toward multilateral
liberalization of international trade which had developed
since World War II, the United States sought to preclude
further discrimination by empowering the President to seek
worldwide solutions to the Common Market challenge.
28
done by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

This was

Another matter of concern on the international scene
was what effect if any the ascendency of an economic power
2

;:/Ibid., 22-23.

28
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of such proportions as the Common Market would have on
American prestige throughout the free world.

The EEC re

presented an area with a population of 170,000,000 people,
quite comparable to that of the United States.

There were

therefore certain situations and circumstances under which
American prestige would be adversely affected.
The first and most obvious potential threat was that
a strong European union does not necessarily work to the ad
vantage of the national interests of the United States.29
While this may be true it was equally certain that any in
crease in the strength of Western Europe would contribute
specifically to the general security of the free world and

hence work indirectly to the advantage of the United States.30
Another. opinion concerning America's world-position
was that a strong Europe would be detrimental to the work of
the United Nations, collective security and world peace.
The general influence of the United States supposeoiy would
be lessened in respect to the smaller countries of the
1
The United States of course took a key role in the
world.3
organization and development of the United Nations and also
had exerted some influence in the creation of European unity.

29

Quincy Wright 11 The Projected European Union and
American International Prestige, r; in Thorsten Sellen (ed.),
The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, CCCXLVI!� (July, 19oJ), 135.
JOibid., 137.
31Ibid., 1
35.
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Although circumstances dictated both efforts, the unification
of Europe was far more important to the United States at the
time of its inception than was the United Nations.
A source of embarrassment to United States was the
fact that it had advocated means to promote its goals in
European union and defense which were resented from a number
of sources.

Examples of this were President Charles DeGaulle

of France who seemed to fear that Britain was a Trojan horse
in which the United States was hiding; and the controversy
over the nskybolt 1' missile rankled not only DeGaulle but also
British leadership as weli.32
In 1962 American policy became more favorable toward
the Common Market when President Kennedy in a historic Fourth
of July

11

rDeclaration of Interdependence r. speech offered to

it an r equal partnership r v·,1ith the United States.

This sug

gestion opened prospects of a new Atlantic relationship as
he stated that at some future date the United States would
be willing to sign a

Declaration of Interdependence ii with
the growing union emerging in Western Europe.33 He believed:
11

• . • that a united Europe will be capable of playing
a greater role in the common defense, of responding more
generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with
the United States and others in lowering trade barriers,
resolving problems of commerce and currency and developing
coordinated policies in all economic, political and
diplomatic areas.34
32Ib. ,
---1::.£·' 135.
33John F. Kennedy, :,The Goal of an Atlantic Partner
ship, 17 Department of State Bulletin, XLVII (July 23, 1962),
132-133.
34Ibid.
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He foresaw in a united Europe a partner 1,'/ith 1,1hom
the United States could deal on the basis of full equality
in all the 1 ·great and burdensome tasks of building and de
fending a community of free nations."
In Brussels the

11

Declaration of Interdependence 1•

speech was received vtlth nreal satisfaction 11 in the Com
mission of the European Economic Community.

In this speech

the Commission saw more than just a renewed affirmation of
the European undertaking.

They considered it a challenge to

themselves to accept the opportunities and responsibilities
of the world situation-- 1 ·to move forward mriftly and directly
to the achievement of full European unification and thus to
lay the foundations of our Atlantic partnership, a partner
ship which takes into account a responsibility to the entire
free world. ,.35
During a trip to Germany President Kennedy said at
Frankfort, June 25, 1963, that American interests were not
trying to dominate the European councils.

He believed that

a weak and divided Europe would serve that purpose better
but instead the United States desired a strong and united
Europe speaking w"ith a common voice and acting 1tnth a common
will-- 1 ·a world power capable of meeting world problems as a
full and equal partner. 1136
35
1rEEC Reply to the President, 1 1 Bulletin from the
European Community, LV (August, 1962), 2-.-

36Ibid.
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Another expression in the same vein of thought was
by Senator William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Re
lations Committee, who thought that the idea of an Atlantic
partnership was an attempt to solve the basic problems of
twentieth century politics.

To him

11

the Atlantic idea, in

short, represents the point at which our needs and our capa
city seem to converge.n37 United States Secretary of State
Dean Rusk said that to develop an Atlantic alliance there
were three main areas in ·which concerted action was needed.
These were in the area.of trade, in the field of monetary and
financial policy, and in aid to newly developing countries.38
This policy was continued by President Lyndon Johnson
who recognized that the EEC as a partner of comparable sta
ture must be dealt with on equal terms in solving mutual
problems and in undertaking the growing number of tasks which
required global cooperation.39
37
nA U. S. View of Atlantic Partnership,n European
Community, LXIII (June, 1963), 6.
8
· 3 nean Rusk, The Atlantic Alliance, U. S. De:partment
of State Series S, No. 20 (Washington, April 7, 1964). This
is a printed copy of an address before the Overseas Press
Club of America, New York, N. Y.
39
walte.r Hallstein, Communi� To.J?i.cs 17, Some of Our
1 Faux Problemes' (Yeovil, Englanct.-;-I9o,), 1-z;:--irnis is
booklet distriouted by the European Community Information
Service, Washington, D. C.

a--

CONCLUSIONS
In an analysis of the relations between the United
States and the EEC until 1963 five major conclusions are
apparent.

First in 1947, the United States vie�,red the unifi

cation of a Europe friendly to America as paramount to the
ascendency of the United States in world affairs.

By 1948,

after American interests were frustrated on repeated occasions
in the United Nations by the Soviet Union's use of the veto,
and after the Communist takeover in Cxechoslovakia, it became
obvious to the United States that the United Nations was not
a reliable instrument to guarantee vrorld peace, freedom and
security.

A step in this direction was the formation of a

third super-power in Western Europe capable and v-r.Llling to
stand v,r.Lth the United States in world affairs.
Second, and corrollary to the first, the United
States viewed the unification of Western Europe as necessary
to stop the advance of Communism.

Smaller weak individual

states could be taken over one by one, but a unified Europe
could adequately defend itself.
Third, before 1957, United States policy had developed
to the point of recognizing the potential trading possibilities
in the Common Market.

To realize this potential the United

States reversed its traditional approach to the tariff.

In

stead of using the tariff as a means to protect American goods
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there developed an effort toward liberalizing world trade
through lowering or eliminating tariff restrictions.

This

resulted in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 which gave
broad powers to the President to negotiate on a linear basis
rather than an item-by-item basis.

A

11

Cornmon :Market i . in

Europe would greatly enhance these negotiations.
Fourth, the United States took the lead in bringing
about changes in tariff and trade policy.

Rather than op

posing liberalization and finally being embarrassed by
having it forced upon them, the United States was sensitive
to the trend of world affairs generally and of the trade
potential of developing nations particularly.

This also was

an area where the Communist problem was acute.
The fifth conclusion was that by the end of 1963,
there was a definite gravitation toward an even more positive
11

Atlantic n relationship.

Among other developments in this

progression was NATO, OECD and the linear tariff reductions
authorized under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.

American

interest in the Atlantic relationship was simply a continu
ation of its interest in the economic unification of Europe.
The motivations were essentially the same--the defense of the
United States by means of a strong united Europe and expansion
of United States trade by establishing a large and equal
trading partner in the European Common Market.
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